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A FINANCIAL ECONOMIC THEORY OF
PUNITIVE DAMAGES
Robert J. Rhee*
This Article provides a financial economic theory of punitive damages. The
core problem, as the Supreme Court acknowledged in Exxon Shipping Co.
v. Baker, is not the systemic amount of punitive damages in the tort system;
rather it is the risk of outlier outcomes. Low frequency, high severity
awards are unpredictable, cause financial distress, and beget social cost.
By focusing only on offsetting escaped liabilit', the standard law and eco-
nomics theory fails to account for the core problem of variance. This
Article provides a risk arbitrage analysis of the relationship between vari-
ance, litigation valuation, and optimal deterrence. Starting with settlement
dynamics, it shows that punitive damages create problematic risk arbitrage
opportunities, which systemically produce under- and overvaluation of
cases. These effects yield inefficient pricing in the litigation system.
Properly conceptualized and applied, punitive damages can mitigate risk
arbitrage that skews actual results from the prescriptions of optimal liabil-
ity and deterrence. The modern Supreme Court jurisprudence is flawed
because it is overbroad. Single-digit multiplier caps underdeter defendants
in most cases of ordinary liability because punitive damages do not suffi-
ciently offset a defendant's risk arbitrage opportunity gained from a lower
litigation risk exposure. When liability is catastrophic, however punitive
damages overdeter defendants, even with a single-digit ratio limit, because
they impart the severe economic cost of financial distress in addition to the
monetary cost of the judgment. These additional economic costs must be
credited toward the calculus of cost internalization and optimal deter-
rence. Thus, a calibrated risk-based theory is needed to support legal
limitations on punitive damages.
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INTRODUCTION
In the course of fundamentally reshaping the law on punitive damages,1
the Supreme Court came to accept the rhetoric that punitive damages are
"out of control."2 This view justified constraining punitive damage awards
under the Due Process Clause of the Constitution in two landmark cases. In
BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore, the Court held that a 500x multiple of
punitive to compensatory damages was a "grossly excessive award" that
violated substantive due process.' In State Farm Mutual Automobile Insur-
ance Co. v. Campbell, the Court signaled that single-digit multipliers are
more likely to satisfy due process.
4
The move toward bright-line quantitative caps has been criticized as
"theoretically bankrupt,"5 "harmful,"6 and "extremely crude."' The Court has
well earned this criticism since it has not explained why single-digit multi-
pliers satisfy constitutional or theoretical concerns aside from relying on an
unfounded perception that punitive damages have spiraled out of control.
The decisions in Gore and Campbell sought to reduce systemically the
amount of punitive damages in the tort system by imposing quantitative caps
as a disciplinary measure on state laws and by imposing standards govern-
ing the permissibility of punitive awards.
I. See Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471 (2008); Philip Morris USA v. Wil-
liams, 549 U.S. 346 (2007); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408 (2003);
BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559 (1996).
2. See, e.g., Browning-Ferris Indus. of Vt., Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257,
282 (1989) (O'Connor, J., dissenting) ("Awards of punitive damages are skyrocketing.").
3. 517 U.S. at 583, 585-86.
4. 538 U.S. at 425.
5. Catherine M. Sharkey, The Exxon Valdez Litigation Marathon: A Window on Puni-
tive Damages, 7 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 25, 28 (2009).
6. Keith N. Hylton, Punitive Damages and the Economic Theory of Penalties, 87 GEo.
L.J. 421,454 (1998).
7. Cass R. Sunstein, Daniel Kahneman & David Schkade, Assessing Punitive Damag-
es (with Notes on Cognition and Valuation in Law), 107 YALE L.J. 2071, 2126 (1998).
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However, the suggestion that tort law redistributes excessive amounts of
wealth is a Potemkin village.' In Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, the Supreme
Court's latest decision on punitive damages, the Court finally rejected the
fallacious premise behind its venture into the workings of state tort law: "A
survey of the literature reveals that discretion to award punitive damages has
not mass-produced runaway awards, and ... by most accounts the median
ratio of punitive to compensatory awards has remained less than 1:1 ."
Bursting the myths advanced by tort reformists,10 Baker concluded that the
tort system has exercised "overall restraint."'"
So what is the problem'? According to Baker, the "real problem, it
seems, is the stark unpredictability of punitive awards."'1 2 Although punitive
damages are seldom awarded in tort cases and the median award is less than
the median compensatory damages award, the variance in awards "is great,
and the outlier cases subject defendants to punitive damages that dwarf the
corresponding compensatories. 13 Variance is a measure of the spread of
potential economic outcomes.14 This spread is the essential quality of riski-
ness.15 The greater the spread of potential outcomes, the greater the risk.
The core problem is not a systemic amount of punitive damages result-
ing in dramatic redistribution of wealth through the tort system. Rather,
the problem is that "punitive damages are a substantial source of variance
in the tort system-something that, in turn, increases the uncertainty over
the ultimate parameters of the defendant's liability."16 Such awards are like
lightning: they rarely strike but when they do, the consequences are se-
vere. The small but very real risk of an excessive award has significant
ripple effects on the entire tort and civil dispute systems. The core problem
in punitive damages is one of risk and uncertainty.
Scholarship on punitive damages has been copious and rich in both theo-
retical and empirical insights.1" As evinced by its influence on the Supreme
8. Sharkey, supra note 5, at 29 ("The ratio factor, moreover, may simply deflect atten-
tion from the fact that the constitutional edifice is, in effect, a house of cards.")
9. 554 U.S. at 497 98 (footnote omitted).
10. See Sharkey, supra note 5, at 36 ("The attack on punitive damages ... has been ...
fueled by myriad organizations representing corporate and business interests."); see also
Baker, 554 U.S. at 501 n. 17 (citing studies).
I1. Baker, 554 U.S. at 497-99.
12. Id. at 499.
13. Id. at 500.
14. Variance is the statistical mean squared deviation from the expected value, which is
the risk of an expected return. RICHARD A. BREALEY ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE FI-
NANCE 163 (10th ed. 2011); M.G. BULMER, PRINCIPLES OF STATISTICS 56 (1979). As used in
this Article, variance is used to connote the riskiness of an expected outcome as measured by
the spread of potential outcomes.
15. See Robert J. Rhee, The Effect fRisk on Legal Valuation, 78 U. COLO. L. REV. 193,
199 (2007) ("With zero variance, there is no risk as the expected result is certain.").
16. RICHARD A. NAGAREDA, MASS TORTS IN A WORLD OF SETTLEMENT 126 (2007).
17. See CASS R. SUNSTEIN ET AL., PUNITIVE DAMAGES (2002); Steve P Calandrillo,
Penalizing Punitive Damages: Why the Supreme Court Needs a Lesson in Law and Economics,
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Court, the empirical scholarship has shed light on facts and dispelled mis-
conceptions about punitive damages. On the theory side, the inquiry has
focused on the purpose of punitive damages. Courts have consistently as-
serted that punitive damages serve the twin goals of "retribution and
deterring harmful conduct.""8 Scholars have advanced a broad array of theo-
ries principally coalescing around these two basic ideas. 19 Law and
economics theory has led the way in establishing a coherent view of deter-
rence.20 The theory has garnered a "remarkable consensus" among a wide
range of scholars that deterrence is a central goal of punitive damages.2'
The standard law and economics theory argues that punitive damages
should be imposed on defendants who would otherwise escape liability
through undetected wrongful acts.22 This concept yields an elegant formula
for calculating punitive damages: punitive damages should equal the harm
78 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 774 (2010); Thomas B. Colby, Clearing the Smoke from Philip Morris
v. Williams: The Past, Present, and Future of Punitive Damages, 118 YALE L.J. 392 (2008);
Robert D. Cooter, Economic Analysis of Punitive Damages, 56 S. CAL. L. REV. 79 (1982);
Marc Galanter & David Luban, Poetic Justice: Punitive Damages and Legal Pluralism, 42
AM. U. L. REV. 1393 (1993); Dan Markel, How Should Punitive Damages Work?, 157 U. PA.
L. REV. 1383 (2009); Dan Markel, Retributive Damages: A Theory of Punitive Damages as
Intermediate Sanction, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 239 (2009); A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven
Shavell, Punitive Damages: An Economic Analysis, Ill HARV. L. REV. 869 (1998); Anthony
J. Sebok, Punitive Damages: From Myth to Theory, 92 IoWA L. REV. 957 (2007); Catherine
M. Sharkey, Punitive Damages as Societal Damages, 113 YALE L.J. 347 (2003); Sunstein,
Kahneman & Schkade, supra note 7; W. Kip Viscusi, The Social Costs of Punitive Damages
Against Corporations in Environmental and Safety Torts, 87 GEO. L.J. 285 (1998); Benjamin
C. Zipursky, A Theory of Punitive Damages, 84 TEX. L. REV. 105 (2005).
In the field of empirical scholarship, one camp has argued that punitive damages are out
of control. See Alison F. Del Rossi & W. Kip Viscusi, The Changing Landscape of Blockbuster
Punitive Damages Awards, 12 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 116, 154 55 (2010); Joni Hersch & W.
Kip Viscusi, Punitive Damages: How Judges and Juries Perform, 33 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 9
(2004). Another camp of empiricists has argued that punitive damages are reasonable and
predictable. See Theodore Eisenberg et al., Juries, Judges, and Punitive Damages: An Empiri-
cal Study, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 743, 745 (2002) [hereinafter Eisenberg et al. 2002]; Theodore
Eisenberg et al., Juries, Judges, and Punitive Damages: Empirical Analyses Using the Civil
Justice Survey of State Courts 1992, 1996 and 2001 Data, 3 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 263,
270 (2006) [hereinafter Eisenberg et al. 2006]; Theodore Eisenberg et al., The Predictability of
Punitive Damages, 26 J. LEGAL STUD. 623, 624-625 (1997) [hereinafter Eisenberg et al.
1997]; Theodore Eisenberg & Martin T. Wells, The Significant Association Between Punitive
and Compensatory Damages in Blockbuster Cases: A Methodological Primer, 3 J. EMPIRICAL
LEGAL STUD. 175, 194 (2006); Theodore Eisenberg et al., Variability in Punitive Damages:
Empirically Assessing Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 166 J. INSTITUTIONAL & THEORETICAL
ECON. 5, 20 (2010) [hereinafter Eisenberg et al. 2010]; Neil Vidmar & Mary R. Rose, Punitive
Damages by Juries in Florida: In Terrorem and in Reality, 38 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 487 (2001).
18. Baker, 554 U.S. at 492; BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 568 (1996);
Sharkey, supra note 17, at 356 57; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 908(1)
(1965).
19. Compare Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 17 (arguing for deterrence), with Sebok,
supra note 17 (arguing for private retribution).
20. See Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 17, at 889-90.
21. Sebok, supra note 17, at 982.
22. Calandrillo, supra note 17, at 799; Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 17, at 874.
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multiplied by the reciprocal of the injurer's chance of being found liable for
wrongful activities. 21 Based on this theory, punitive damages should provide
a level of liability sufficient to achieve full cost internalization and optimal
deterrence. Despite the elegance of the idea, the standard law and economics
theory fails to account for the central problem of punitive damages identi-
fied by the Supreme Court and other scholars-the relationship between the
risk associated with high variance outcomes and the theory of punitive dam-
ages. On this issue, the Court has suggested that it would be open to
accepting variance as a desirable effect if variance promoted an "optimal
level of penalty and deterrence," but there is neither empirical evidence nor
theory explaining the role of variance or how it should be used.24 This Arti-
cle provides a theory of variance.
Consistent with law and economics thought, the premise of this Article
is that tort law should deter wrongful conduct by imposing an optimal level
of liability. However, undetected wrongful conduct, the key point of the
standard law and economics model, is not the principal problem. The es-
sential problem concerns the relationship between the riskiness of punitive
damages and the deterrence effect of punitive damages. A complete theory
requires a financial economic analysis to determine the effect of risk on
the valuation of uncertain future cash flows-in the legal and dispute
resolution contexts, the effect of risk on the valuation of disputed legal
rights. Yet no scholar has undertaken a financial economic analysis of pu-
nitive damages.
A nascent but growing body of scholarship has applied principles of fi-
nancial economics to model the civil litigation system.26 This work suggests
that civil litigation for money damages, such as tort cases, fundamentally
boils down to assigning financial values to a disputed right, analogous to
how rights to uncertain future cash flows associated with securities instru-
ments and capital assets are valued in the financial markets. 21 Commenting
on the recent insights provided by a finance perspective, Professor Richard
Nagareda has observed that finance-based models of litigation behavior
complement the cognitive psychology models of the civil justice system:
23. Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 17, at 889.
24. Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471, 500 (2008).
25. STEPHEN A. Ross, NEOCLASSICAL FINANCE 1 (2005).
26. See Joseph A. Grundfest & Peter H. Huang, The Unexpected Value of Litigation: A
Real Options Perspective, 58 STAN. L. REV. 1267 (2006); Jonathan T. Molot, Litigation Fi-
nance: A Market Solution to a Procedural Problem, 99 GEO. L.J. 65 (2010); Jonathan T.
Molot, A Market in Litigation Risk, 76 U. CHI. L. REv. 367 (2009); Richard A. Nagareda,
Autonomy, Peace, and Put Options in the Mass Tort Class Action, 115 HARV. L. REV. 747
(2002); Rhee, supra note 15; Robert J. Rhee, A Price Theory f Legal Bargaining: An Inquiry
into the Selection of Settlement and Litigation Under Uncertainty, 56 EMORY L.J. 619, 623
(2006) [hereinafter Rhee, Price Theory of Legal Bargaining]; Robert J. Rhee, Toward Proce-
dural Optionality: Private Ordering of Public Adjudication, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 514 (2009)
[hereinafter Rhee, Toward Procedural Optionality].
27. Rhee, supra note 15, at 193; Rhee, Toward Procedural Optionality, supra note 26,
at 534.
October 2012]
Michigan Law Review
Risk matters not just in the sense of whether a given party faces a potential
gain or loss in the endgame of litigation. From a finance-based standpoint,
risk also matters in the sense that a given party might stand to bear or to
impose risk itself in the form of variance.2"
Risk is important to an understanding of the litigation and tort systems,
and a theory of punitive damages should account for it. Drawing on recent
insights from the finance perspective of litigation, this Article advances an
alternative deterrence-based theory.
Viewed from this perspective, the modem Supreme Court reformation of
punitive damages is wrong. With optimal deterrence as one normative end,
the prescriptions in Gore and Campbell are overbroad, underdeterring in
some circumstances and overdeterring in others. Central to this thesis is the
problem of settlement. Punitive damages affect not only the small class of
cases most likely to be candidates for punitive awards, but they also have
significant ripple effects on the settlement side of the tort system. These
ripple effects are not visible through analysis of case law. Although schol-
ars have suggested a "shadow effect" on settlement,29 with some
suggesting that punitive damages increase settlement values,30 no scholar
has advanced an economic theory that integrates settlement into the calcu-
lus of optimal deterrence.
This Article advances an arbitrage theory of the relationship among var-
iance, punitive damages, and settlement." In financial markets, arbitrage is
the process of making an abnormal profit by buying assets in one market
and selling them in another, or vice versa, to profit from an unjustified price
difference.3 2 Sustained or systematic arbitrage opportunities evince inefficien-
cies in market pricing. As used here, the term "arbitrage" connotes the concept
28. Richard A. Nagareda, 1938 All Over Again? Pretrial as Trial in Complex Litigation,
60 DEPAUL L. REV. 647, 660 (2011).
29. Thomas Koenig, The Shadow Effect of Punitive Damages on Settlements, 1998 Wis.
L. REV. 169, 172 (1998); Sebok, supra note 17, at 965; see also Thomas A. Eaton, David B.
Mustard & Susette M. Talarico, The E~ffects of Seeking Punitive Damages on the Processing of
Tort Claims, 34 J. LEGAL STUD. 343, 353-34, 357 (2005); Herbert M. Kritzer & Frances Kahn
Zemans, The Shadow of Punitives: An Unsuccessful Effort To Bring It into View, 1998 Wis. L.
REV. 157, 166 (1998); A. Mitchell Polinsky, Are Punitive Damages Really Insignificant, Pre-
dictable, and Rational? A Comment on Eisenberg et al., 26 J. LEGAL STUD. 663, 665 (1997).
30. See George L. Priest, Punitive Damages Reform: The Case of Alabama, 56 LA. L.
REV. 825, 830 (1996); Viscusi, supra note 17, at 326-27.
31. I make three caveats that limit the scope of the inquiry here. First, this Article is not
about the retribution theory, its relationship to the deterrence goal, or whether one or the other
is the predominant policy in punitive damages. Second, this Article is not about how the rules
prescribed here can be molded to a constitutional theory of punitive damages, if there is one.
Third, the economic concept of severe liability and its effect on corporate finance applies to
other areas of tort law, specifically mass torts and class actions. These issues are related be-
cause they share the essential attribute of catastrophic legal risk. But these areas of law also
significantly differ: the principal difference being that financial distress is irrelevant in mass
torts and class actions because compensation is mandatory upon proof of liability, whereas
punitive damages are discretionary awards.
32. RANDALL S. BILLINGSLEY, UNDERSTANDING ARBITRAGE (2006).
[Vol. 111:33
Financial Economic Theory of Punitive Damages
that a class of litigants can systematically enjoy advantages during settlement
due to consistent, predictable, and recurring circumstances, resulting in ag-
gregate settlement values that deviate from expected judicial outcomes.
While in an individual case a party's unique advantage is understood in the
lexicon of bargaining as "leverage,"33 arbitrage is a more apt term here be-
cause it communicates the idea of prices deviating from intrinsic values
across the tort system and accordingly affecting the system's efficiency.
This Article shows that risk imposes significant economic costs that are
borne by both parties to a litigation under different circumstances. Financial
economics tell us that risk has a price. Investors must be paid to bear risk;
the greater the risk, the more they must be compensated. 4 The nature of
litigation requires that parties be risk bearers, and their exposure to litigation
risks is different depending on whether the risk is ordinary or severe. In
most circumstances where the potential liability is ordinary, a corporate de-
fendant has a lower exposure to litigation risk than an individual plaintiff
and thus enjoys a systemic risk arbitrage opportunity resulting from repeat-
ed valuational concessions at settlement by plaintiffs under a set of recurring
conditions. 5 This settlement effect tends to undervalue cases from the per-
spective of optimal liability. However, when a corporate defendant is
exposed to catastrophic risk-low frequency, high severity awards-the risk
arbitrage flips to a systematic advantage for plaintiffs. The defendant will
pay a risk premium to eliminate the risk through settlement. This settlement
effect tends to overvalue cases. Unlike the standard law and economics theo-
ry of punitive damages, which focuses on using punitive damages to correct
escaped liability, this Article argues that optimal deterrence is best achieved
by using punitive damages to mitigate these mutual risk arbitrage opportuni-
ties. This Article provides a financial model of these effects per principles of
corporate finance valuation, premium underwriting, and capital budgeting.
When the principal defendants at issue are corporations, a theory of punitive
damages must account for the implications on corporate finance and risk
transfer.
This analysis yields simple prescriptive rules for regulating punitive
damages: (1) when punitive damages do not threaten financial distress, 6
there should be no regulation of punitive damages outside of traditional,
preexisting state law protections against excess and abuse; (2) the cap on
punitive damages should not be some arbitrary cap based on a numeric ratio,
but it should instead be a function of the defendant's wealth such that punitive
33. See Robert H. Mnookin & Robert B. Wilson, Rational Bargaining and Market
Efficiency: Understanding Pennzoil v. Texaco, 75 VA. L. REV. 295, 299 (1989) (defining "lev-
erage" as a means "to extract a more favorable settlement").
34. See Harry Markowitz, Portfolio Selection, 7 J. FIN. 77, 77 (1952) ("[T]he investor
does (or should) consider expected return a desirable thing and variance of return an undesira-
ble thing." (emphasis omitted)).
35. Robert J. Rhee, Tort Arbitrage, 60 FLA. L. REV. 125, 181 (2008).
36. Financial distress is defined as substantial disruptions in a firm's ordinary opera-
tions resulting from a severe financial loss. It has significant economic consequences. See
infra Section III.C.
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damages are limited to the point at which the defendant would experience
financial distress. For the vast majority of tort cases, financial distress is not
an issue, and in these cases the pre-Gore jurisprudence best promotes opti-
mal deterrence. Even a minute probabilistic threat of high multiple and/or
dollar value awards tends to offset a corporate defendant's risk arbitrage in
settlement; accordingly, not capping punitive damages increases settlement
values, achieving valuations closer to expected judicial outcomes. However,
the economic costs associated with the financial distress generally impart
greater social cost than any adverse incentives arising from inadequate lia-
bility assessment due to escaped liability." The limit of punitive damages
can be defined as the maximum imposable residual liability net of compen-
satory damages and the financial economic costs on the firm associated with
the litigation risk.
This Article is organized into five Parts. Part I provides an overview of
the law and frames the central problem in this area of law. Part II summariz-
es the standard law and economics theory of punitive damages and then
critiques this theory from the perspective of achieving optimal deterrence.
Part III provides a financial economic model of how parties settle cases and
shows why plaintiffs and defendants have different risk arbitrage opportuni-
ties during settlement depending on the circumstances and the nature of the
risks each party confronts. Part IV argues that optimal deterrence is
achieved only when the prices of legal actions are efficient and there are no
arbitrage opportunities at settlement. It then relates this principle to the
proper rules for regulating punitive damages. Lastly, Part V applies the theo-
ry of variance and risk arbitrage advanced here to reassess the Supreme
Court's reformation of punitive damages.
I. THE CENTRAL PROBLEM OF PUNITIVE DAMAGES
A. From Constitutional Reformation to Legal Uncertainty
Although punitive damages are well established in American tort law,"
the Supreme Court has undertaken a major reformation of punitive damages
jurisprudence over the past twenty years, which has resulted in significant
constitutional restrictions on punitive damages awards. I provide a brief re-
view of the case law to focus specifically on the multipliers in the cases and
to provide a sense of the positions of individual Justices.
In Browning-Ferris Industries of Vermont, Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc.,
the Court addressed the issue of whether the Eighth Amendment applies to
punitive damages." The case arose out of the defendant's attempt to drive
37. See infra Section III.C (discussing the economic costs of financial distress).
38. See Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471, 490-91 (2008) (citing Boyd v.
United States, 116 U.S. 616, 626 (1886); Day v. Woodworth, 54 U.S. (13 How.) 363, 371
(1852) (punitive damages had "become widely accepted in American courts by the middle of
the 19th century").
39. 492 U.S. 257, 260 (1989).
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the plaintiff out of a local disposal business through illegal price-fixing and
tortious interference with contracts. 40 The jury awarded compensatory dam-
ages of $51,146 and punitive damages of $6 million. 41 The Court, per
Justice Blackmun, held that the Eighth Amendment does not apply to civil
actions when the government is not a party.
42
Justice O'Connor, concurring in part and dissenting in part, argued that
corporations should be given Eighth Amendment protection against the
threat of "overbearing and oppressive monetary sanctions. '43 She introduced
the germ of the idea of a quantitative standard. The multiple of punitive to
compensatory damages was 117x, far exceeding the highest reported award
of punitive damages in the state, and she implied that a multiple of 30x
should be considered suspect. 44 She also suggested that the imposition of
punitive damages could violate due process, a position that three other Jus-
tices shared.
45
In Pacific Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Haslip, the Court, per Justice
Blackmun, considered whether the Fourteenth Amendment applies to
punitive damages. 46 The defendant insurance company was held liable for
punitive damages under the theory of respondeat superior when its em-
ployee-agent embezzled the plaintiff's premium money and allowed the
policy to lapse. The plaintiff was awarded $1,040,000, of which $200,000
was apparently compensatory, including $4,000 in out-of-pocket expens-
es.47 The Court approved the punitive damages award, a multiple of 4x.41 It
declined to "draw a mathematical bright line" and instead suggested that
the appropriate constitutional calculus is one of "general concerns of rea-
sonableness.1
49
Justice Scalia concurred to reject the idea of substantive due process re-
view for punitive damages. 50 Justice Kennedy concurred to opine that a lack
of uniformity in punitive damages cannot be equated to constitutional infir-
mity since variance in outcomes is the nature of civil litigation in general,
and that the usual protections given by states must suffice until common law
40. Browning-Ferris, 492 U.S. at 260 61.
41. Id. at 262.
42. Id. at 263 64.
43. Id. at 285 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (joined by Jus-
tice Stevens).
44. Id. at 282.
45. Id. at 283. Justices Brennan and Marshall concurred specially to make this point. Id.
at 280 81 (Brennan, J., concurring) (joined by Justice Marshall). With Justices O'Connor and
Stevens, four Justices opined that the Due Process Clause applies to awards of punitive dam-
ages.
46. 499 U.S. 1,4(1991).
47. Haslip, 499 U.S. at 6, 7 & n.2.
48. Id. at 23-24.
49. Id. at 18.
50. Id. at 25, 28 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment).
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judges or legislatures initiate systemic changes.5' Justice O'Connor was the
sole dissenter. Describing punitive damages as a "powerful weapon,"5 she
argued for a reevaluation of punitive damages, contending that there had
been an explosion in the frequency and size of punitive awards and that ju-
ries were not constrained in their discretion."
In TXO Production Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp., the Court ad-
dressed whether a punitive damages award of $10 million on top of
compensatory damages of $19,000, a multiple of 526x, violated due process.54
The Court upheld the judgment but was split as to reasoning. Relying on
Haslip, the plurality Court, per Justice Stevens, declined to draw mathematical
bright lines. 55 The high multiple was not controlling in this case in light of the
large amount of money at stake, the defendant's bad faith, a larger pattern of
fraud and deceit, and the defendant's wealth.56 The Court also noted that the
"shock dissipates when one considers the potential loss" to the plaintiff of
$1 million, a punitive damages multiple of only IOx. 57 Justices Scalia con-
curred to opine that the Court should "shut the door" on the idea of a
substantive due process right to be free of excessive punitive damages.58 He
predicted the following: "The plurality's decision is valuable, then, in that
the great majority of due process challenges to punitive damages awards can
henceforth be disposed of simply with the observation that 'this is no worse
than TXO.' -9 This prophecy was ultimately proven wrong as the Court con-
tinued to delve into the jurisprudence of punitive damages.
In the next case, the landmark decision of BMW of North America, Inc.
v. Gore, the Court for the first time invalidated a punitive damages award
under the Due Process Clause.60 The facts are well known. A national car
dealership sold a car as new when it had been repaired; at trial, the actual
damages were $4,000 and the jury awarded punitive damages of $4 million
(later reduced on appeal to $2 million).6 The issue was whether the 500x
multiple comported with due process. The Court, per Justice Stevens, set
forth a legal standard composing of three guideposts: (1) the degree of rep-
rehensibility, (2) the disparity between the harm and the punitive damages,
and (3) the difference between the punitive damages and the civil penalties
imposed or authorized in other cases.6 2 Applying these factors, the Court
51. Id. at 41-42 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment).
52. Id. at 42 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
53. Id. at 61 63.
54. 509 U.S. 443, 446 (1993).
55. TXO, 509 at 458, 460, 462.
56. Id. at 462.
57. Id. While the compensatory award was $19,000, the Court noted that the potential
harm to the plaintiff could have been in the range of $1$4 million. Id.
58. Id. at 470,472.
59. Id.
60. 517 U.S. 559(1996).
61. Gore, 517 U.S. at 563-67.
62. Id. at 575.
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determined that the conduct was not so reprehensible, considering that the
harm was "purely economic in nature" and involved an omission of fact that
may have had a good-faith basis.63 The Court considered the 4x multiple in
Haslip and the 10x multiple to the potential harm in TXO and determined
that "a breathtaking 500 to 1" ratio is constitutionally infirm.
6 4
Gore was a close case. Justices Scalia and Thomas dissented on the
now-familiar objection to substantive due process review and dismissed the
three guideposts as "a road to nowhere." 65 Justices Ginsburg and Rehnquist
also dissented but on the grounds that states have an interest in punishment
and deterrence, that the procedure satisfied due process, and that the Court
was unwisely venturing into the realm of state law.
66
In State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Campbell, the Court
further strengthened the constraints on punitive damages. 67 In an action for
insurance bad faith arising out of the insurer's failure to settle a third-party
liability claim, the jury awarded $1 million in compensatory damages and
$145 million in punitive damages. 68 The Court, per Justice Kennedy, applied
Gore's three guideposts.69 Additionally, the Court famously laid down a
quantitative marker: "Our jurisprudence and the principles it has now estab-
lished demonstrate, however, that, in practice, few awards exceeding a
single-digit ratio between punitive and compensatory damages, to a signifi-
cant degree, will satisfy due process. 7 0 Based largely on the fact that the
multiple at issue was 145x, the Court struck down the award.
7 1
In Philip Morris USA v. Williams, the plaintiff argued that the defendant
cigarette manufacturer knowingly and falsely led him to believe that smok-
ing was safe. 72 The jury awarded compensatory damages of $821,000 and
punitive damages of $79.5 million, a multiple of 96.8x. Notably, Williams is
the only case in the line from Browning-Ferris to Campbell that involved
personal injuries . 71 The Court chose not to consider whether this award was
grossly excessive.7 4 Instead, it focused on whether punitive damages can be
based in part on a jury's desire to punish the defendant for harming nonparty
63. Id. at 575 80.
64. Id. at 581 83.
65. Id. at 598 607.
66. Id. at 607 19.
67. 538 U.S. 408 (2003).
68. Campbell, 538 U.S. at 412 15.
69. Id. at418 28.
70. Id. at 425.
71. Id. at 429. Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Ginsburg dissented along similar lines of
reasoning as expressed in their dissents in Gore. Id. at 429 (Scalia, J., dissenting); id. at 429-
30 (Thomas, J., dissenting); id. at 30-39 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
72. 549 U.S. 346, 349-50 (2007).
73. C(. Campbell, 538 U.S. at 426 ("The harm arose from a transaction in the economic
realm, not from some physical assault or trauma .... "); BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517
U.S. 559, 576 (1996) ("The harm BMW inflicted on Dr. Gore was purely economic in na-
ture.").
74. Williams, 549 U.S. at 353.
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victims. This issue-punitive damages based in part on broader harm to others
arising from similar activities-was also present in Gore and Campbell."
The Williams Court, per Justice Breyer, directly addressed the issue and held
that a jury may not punish a defendant for harms caused to others but that it
may consider such conduct in determining reprehensibility.
7 6
The constitutional journey into the jurisprudence of punitive damages
took a detour into federal maritime law with Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker.
7
The case arose out of the 1989 oil spill in the Prince William Sound where
Exxon's ship ran aground. On claims brought by commercial fishermen for
lost profit,78 the jury awarded $287 million in compensatory damages and
punitive damages of $5 billion (later remitted to $2.5 billion). The issue was
whether federal maritime law constrains punitive damages. The Court, per
Justice Souter, was skeptical that verbal formulations could work to promote
"systemic consistency."79 Looking to the median multiple of punitive dam-
ages (cited as 0.65x based on empirical scholarly studies), the Court set a
1: 1 ratio cap on punitive damages in maritime cases.80
Three prominent themes can be seen in the line of cases from Brown-
ing-Ferris to Baker. The first theme is obvious but worth mentioning. The
Supreme Court increasingly lost confidence in state process and juries.81
The earlier cases exhibit a reluctance to actively review lower court deci-
sions. Justice O'Connor speculated that the Court's early reticence stemmed
from not wanting to open the door to wholesale review of state tort law
practices. 82 But that reticence was overcome by the time the Court decided
Gore, a case in which the Court substituted its judgment on the degree of
egregiousness-ordinarily the fact finder's prerogative-to strike down the
award. 83 Gore, Campbell, and Baker exhibit an activist approach of review-
ing and superseding state judgments on matters of evidentiary weight and
implementation of state policy.84
75. Campbell, 538 U.S. at 420, 422-23; Gore, 517 U.S. at 568-74; id. at 608 (Gins-
burg, J., dissenting).
76. Williams, 549 U.S. at 356 57. Justices Stevens, Scalia, Thomas, and Ginsburg dis-
sented.
77. 554 U.S. 471 (2008).
78. Baker, 554 U.S. at 476. For a discussion of the rights of fishermen to recover for
lost profit, see Robert J. Rhee, A Production Theory of Pure Economic Loss, 104 Nw. U. L.
REV. 49, 54-60, 94 103 (2010).
79. Baker, 554 U.S. at 504.
80. Id. at 513. Justices Stevens, Ginsburg, and Breyer concurred in part and dissented in
part.
81. See Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 63 (1991) (O'Connor, J., dissent-
ing) ("When we lose that confidence [in fair and reasonable results], a change must be
made.").
82. See id. at 64.
83. BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 585 86 (1996); id. at 612 (Ginsburg,
J., dissenting).
84. Michael P. Allen, The Supreme Court, Punitive Damages and State Sovereignty, 13
GEO. MASON L. REV. 1, 10 (2004).
[Vol. 111:33
Financial Economic Theory of Punitive Damages
The second theme is the most notable-a move away from a qualita-
tive, multifactor standard to a rule-based numerical cap." In Haslip, the
Court declined to "draw a mathematical bright line." 6 This principle was
later repeated in TXO, Gore, and Campbell,"7 but the professed rejection of
hard-and-fast numeric caps in Campbell seems inconsistent when in the
same paragraph the Court wrote "[s]ingle-digit multipliers are more likely
to comport with due process.""8 Justice Kennedy, who authored Campbell,
seems to have been the bellwether for this shift in the Court's thinking as he
was the only Justice to have reversed his earlier position on numerical
caps. 9 The analytic framework of a numerical cap is seen in Baker, which
rejected a qualitative standard in favor of a bright-line Ix multiple limit.90
Although Baker is a maritime case, the influence of its support for numeri-
cal caps and its policy rationale extend beyond its subject-matter
jurisdiction.9
The third theme is a link among punitive damages, corporate interests,
and economic policy. Through all of the punitive damages cases, the Court
advanced a pro-business economic agenda by protecting corporations from
excessive liability. All of the cases from Browning-Ferris to Baker involved
large national corporations.92 That corporations were the principal defend-
ants raises two economic issues. The Court feared that punitive damages
could give juries the power to improperly redistribute the wealth stored in
corporations. 93 And, in a line of thinking developed in the later cases, the
Court feared that the principle of federalism could be undermined when
state tort law conflicts with interstate commerce and the national economy.
94
85. The Court has repeatedly asserted that reprehensibility is the most significant
guidepost. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 419 (2003); Gore, 517
U.S. at 575. But the quantitative cap has become the important factor. Sharkey, supra note 5,
at 27-28.
86. Haslip, 499 U.S. at 18.
87. Campbell, 538 U.S. at 424-25; Gore, 517 U.S. at 582 83; TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alli-
ance Res. Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 458 (1993).
88. Campbell, 538 U.S. at 425.
89. "The Constitution identifies no particular multiple of compensatory damages as an
acceptable limit for punitive awards; it does not concern itself with the dollar amounts, ratios,
or the quirks of juries in specific jurisdictions." TXO, 509 U.S. at 467 (Kennedy, J., concur-
ring).
90. Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471, 504 (2008).
91. See, e.g., Hayduk v. City of Johnstown, 580 F. Supp. 2d 429, 483 n.46 (W.D. Pa.
2008) (noting that Baker has "a much broader application").
92. Philip Morris, State Farm, Exxon, BMW, and Pacific Mutual Life are well known.
The defendants in Browning-Ferris and TXO were also national companies. TXO, 509 U.S. at
450 n.9; Browning-Ferris Indus. of Vt., Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 260 (1989).
93. See TXO, 509 U.S. at 490 91 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
94. See Philip Morris USA v. Williams, 549 U.S. 346, 355 (2007); State Farm Mut.
Auto Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 421 22 (2003); BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517
U.S. 559, 571 (1996); see also Samuel Issacharoff & Catherine M. Sharkey, Backdoor Feder-
alization, 53 UCLA L. REV. 1353 (2006); Sharkey, supra note 5, at 30-31.
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The line of cases from Browning-Ferris to Baker spanned nineteen years
and involved fifteen Justices. Several Justices have been influential beyond
their single vote. Justice O'Connor has been the most vocal critic of punitive
damages and advocate of strict constraints, and her forceful dissents in
Browning-Ferris, Haslip, and TXO may have influenced her colleagues and
the Court's later thinking. Justice Stevens authored the plurality opinion in
TXO and the majority opinion in Gore. Justices Kennedy, Breyer, and Souter
authored respectively the majority opinions in Campbell, Williams, and
Baker. Justices Kennedy and Breyer still sit on the Court today, and both
have voted in favor of constitutional constraints. Chief Justice Roberts voted
with the majority in Williams and Baker, and Justice Alito did the same in
Williams. Justices Scalia and Thomas have opposed the idea of substantive
due process limitations on punitive damages. Justice Ginsburg dissented in
Gore, Campbell, Williams, and Baker, and she opposes the Court's applica-
tion, if not the theory, of constitutional constraint.
We do not know whether the law has been shaped into its final form by
Gore, Campbell, Williams, and Baker, or whether it will continue to evolve
into greater restrictions or even reverse course. Five members of the current
Court-Justices Kennedy, Breyer, Scalia, Ginsburg, and Thomas-have
staked out well-articulated positions on the issue. Scalia, Thomas, and
Ginsburg disfavor constitutional scrutiny, perhaps for different reasons. Four
Justices are relative newcomers to the debate: the Chief Justice and Justices
Alito, Sotomayor, and Kagan. Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito likely
favor constraints on punitive damages per their political and pro-business
inclinations,95 an educated guess supported by their respective votes in
Williams and Baker. If we assume that Justices Scalia and Thomas continue
to believe that the application of substantive due process to punitive
damages is wrong and that they will vote based on their core beliefs
despite whatever pro-business leanings they may have, the tally is 4 to 3 in
favor to continuing the current trajectory of the law. Justices Sotomayor and
Kagan, who joined the Court after Baker, are the unknown factors, and they
will be the swing voters in future cases.
In addition to changing judicial composition, a theoretical deficit creates
uncertainty about the future direction of the law. The Court has not articu-
lated a theory of punitive damages. There is little justification for why it is
"unfair" or "arbitrary" or "excessive" to impose punitive damages beyond
the assertion that a single-digit multiplier is the limit. Absent a theory with
analytic rigor, these characterizations are simply labels attached to a vote.
The Court recognizes the common formulation that punitive damages serve
95. Since 1953, Justices Alito, Roberts, Thomas, and Scalia are in the top-ten list of
Justices with the most pro-business bias. See Lee Epstein, William M. Landes & Richard A.
Posner, Is the Roberts Court Pro-Business? 2, 4 (Dec. 17, 2010) (unpublished study), availa-
ble at http://epstein.usc.edu/research/RobertsBusiness.pdf. Among active Justices, Alito and
Roberts are the most pro-business. See id. at 12-13.
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the goals of deterrence and retribution.96 But it has not developed a theory of
how retribution and deterrence are served by judicially capping punitive
damages. Several Justices have been dismissive of economic analysis,9
which is odd since that body of scholarship has developed the most sophis-
ticated analysis of deterrence theory.
The current Court composition and the theoretical deficit in the judicial
literature have created uncertainty as to the future direction of punitive dam-
ages jurisprudence. Justice Kennedy is frequently considered the "swing
vote," but in this area Justices Sotomayor and Kagan will play a crucial role
in the development of the law. The Court "is in the midst of a major reexam-
ination of punitive damages-the final chapter of which has not yet been
written."98 At the same time, there is a crisis in the theory of punitive dam-
ages. 99
B. Bursting the Myth and Identifying the Central Problem
The Supreme Court case law on punitive damages is commonly seen as
being driven by a concern regarding "grossly excessive" punitive damages
in the tort system. However, the perception that punitive damages have run
amok is empirically false and has been disavowed. In Baker, the Court ex-
anined for the first time the well-developed empirical scholarship on
punitive damages and concluded that there is no systemic problem with re-
spect to aggregate liability amount. The Court's opinion not only disavowed
a major assertion of the problem, but also much of the rhetoric that accom-
panied it. Two sweeping paragraphs of the opinion are important:
American punitive damages have been the target of audible criticism in re-
cent decades, but the most recent studies tend to undercut much of it. A
survey of the literature reveals that discretion to award punitive damages
has not mass-produced runaway awards, and although some studies show
the dollar amounts of punitive-damages awards growing over time, even in
real terms, by most accounts the median ratio of punitive to compensatory
awards has remained less than 1:1. Nor do the data substantiate a marked
increase in the percentage of cases with punitive awards over the past sev-
eral decades. The figures thus show an overall restraint and suggest that in
many instances a high ratio of punitive to compensatory damages is sub-
stantially greater than necessary to punish or deter.
96. Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471, 492 (2008); Campbell, 538 U.S. at
416; Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Grp., Inc., 532 U.S. 424, 432 (2001); Gore, 517
U.S. at 568; Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 19 (1991).
97. See Browning -Ferris, 492 U.S. at 300 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissent-
ing in part) (joined by Justice Stevens) ("[T]he Eighth Amendment does not incorporate the
views of the Law and Economics School."); TXO, 509 U.S. at 491-92 (O'Connor, J., dissent-
ing) (joined by Justices White and Souter) (noting that the Fourteenth Amendment "does not
require us to adopt the views of the Law and Economics school"); cf Cooper, 532 U.S. at 439
(noting that "deterrence is not the only purpose served by punitive damages").
98. Sebok, supra note 17, at 959.
99. Id. at 960; see also Zipursky, supra note 17, at 105 06 (noting the "constitutional
puzzle" created by Gore and its progeny).
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The real problem, it seems, is the stark unpredictability of punitive awards.
Courts of law are concerned with fairness as consistency, and evidence that
the median ratio of punitive to compensatory awards falls within a reasona-
ble zone, or that punitive awards are infrequent, fails to tell us whether the
spread between high and low individual awards is acceptable. The available
data suggest it is not. A recent comprehensive study of punitive damages
awarded by juries in state civil trials found a median ratio of punitive to
compensatory awards of just 0.62:1, but a mean ratio of 2.90:1 and a
standard deviation of 13.81. Even to those of us unsophisticated in statis-
tics, the thrust of these figures is clear: the spread is great, and the outlier
cases subject defendants to punitive damages that dwarf the corresponding
compensatories. o.
In Baker, the Court dealt "a decisive blow" to the claim that punitive
damages are out of control. 10 1 Upon reviewing the empirical scholarship for
the first time, the Court silenced much of the noise in the debate over puni-
tive damages.
10 2
The leading empirical scholars in this field, Theodore Eisenberg and his
coauthors chief among them, have shown that: (1) punitive damages are in-
frequently awarded, 103 (2) the amount of punitive damages is highly
correlated to the amount of compensatory damages, 10 4 (3) the median ratio
of punitive to compensatory damages is less than 1.0,105 and (4) punitive
damages are most likely to be awarded for intentional torts and economic
wrongs. 10 6 The empirical evidence shows that punitive damages are infre-
100. Baker, 554 U.S. at 497 500 (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted) (citations omit-
ted).
101. Sharkey, supra note 5, at 38.
102. Baker, 554 U.S. at 497-98 nn.13-15. Eisenberg et al. have shown that all of the
high mean and high variance data referenced in Baker were attributed to compensatory dam-
age awards of less than $10,000. Eisenberg et al. 2010, supra note 17, at 16. The implication
is that these awards may have had high ratios, but the awards themselves were not severe (or
severe enough) given the low compensatory damages.
103. See Eisenberg et al. 2002, supra note 17, at 745 (noting that punitive damages are
"rare"); Eisenberg et al. 1997, supra note 17, at 635 (showing that punitive damages are
awarded in less than 10% of trials in which plaintiffs won); see also Stephen Daniels & Jo-
anne Martin, Myth and Reality in Punitive Damages, 75 MINN. L. REV. 1, 31 (1990)
(reporting that punitive damages were awarded in 8.8% of positive plaintiff verdicts); Sebok,
supra note 17, at 964 & n.19 (showing that punitive damages have been awarded in 2% to 9%
of positive plaintiff verdicts); Vidmar & Rose, supra note 17, at 487 (reporting that awards
were "strikingly low").
104. Eisenberg et al. 2002, supra note 17, at 745; Eisenberg et al. 1997, supra note 17, at
647; see also Sebok, supra note 17, at 970-7 1.
105. See Eisenberg et al. 2002, supra note 17, at 754 (reporting that the vast majority of
cases clustered around a ratio of 0.88 to 0.98); Eisenberg et al. 2006, supra note 17, at 269
(reporting median ratios of 0.62 and 0.66 in jury and bench trials); Vidmar & Rose, supra note
17, at 492 (reporting a median ratio of 0.67).
106. Eisenberg et al. 1997, supra note 17, at 633; see also Sebok, supra note 17, at 967.
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quent, stable, and predictable, 10 and that the myth of out-of-control punitive
damages is "groundless."'1°
If the aggregate amount of punitive damages is not the problem, then
what is? The Baker Court identified the real problem as the variance of
awards, which translates into the "stark unpredictability of punitive
awards.' 1 9 Finding no empirical or theoretical support for the proposition
that variance is a good thing, the Court disapproved of variability between
awards for the same or similar conduct and the resulting unpredictability. 10
C. The Problem of Low Frequency, High Severity Awards
The main thrust of the criticism of punitive damages relates to the pre-
dictability of punitive damages at the individual level.' Unpredictability
suggests arbitrariness and incoherence in the litigation system. Defendants
cannot gauge ex ante the range of liability arising from their conduct. In-
dividual judgments, the argument goes, are incoherent due to a lack of
case-by-case predictability. Cass Sunstein, Daniel Kahneman, and David
Schkade have prominently advanced this argument. 1 2 They argue that
while jurors consistently share moral judgments about a defendant's con-
duct, they have difficulty in mapping such judgments onto an unbounded
scale of dollars." 3 The problem of monetizing shared moral sentiments can
lead to erratic, unpredictable, and arbitrary awards.'"
The problem of uncertainty and unpredictability is a legitimate policy
concern. But the statement of the problem must be refined further. First of
all, empirical evidence undercuts much of the unpredictability claim. Indi-
vidual cases are predictable based on statistical inference. If one were to
predict in any given case that, first, punitive damages would not be awarded,
and second, if punitive damages were awarded at all, the amount awarded
would be correlated to the compensatory damages, that prediction would be
fairly reasonable as a matter of statistics and probability. Punitive damages
are predictable, but obviously predictions are not perfect. Deviations from
expectation will occur.
107. See Sebok, supra note 17, at 962-76 (showing that punitive damages are not "out of
control" based on the metrics of frequency, amount, and predictability).
108. Id. at 960.
109. Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471, 472 (2008); see also Pac. Mut. Life
Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 42 (1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (noting the problem of "the
size and recurring unpredictability of punitive damages awards"); id. at 43 (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting) (noting the problem of "uncertainty" in the process and "inconsistent and unpre-
dictable results").
110. Baker, 554 U.S. at 499 501 (citing as an example BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517
U.S. 559, 565 n.8 (1996)).
II1. See Polinsky, supra note 29, at 672.
112. Sunstein, Kahneman & Schkade, supra note 7.
113. Id. at 2074.
114. Id.
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No serious person argues that uncertainty can be eliminated entirely from
the litigation system.1"5 We live in an uncertain world, and some of the major
achievements in economics have dealt with the study of risk and
uncertainty.1 6 Uncertainty and randomness are inherent in the legal system.
Nor should there be any entitlement in the civil litigation system to certainty
of outcomes. Certainty in litigation is achieved only with fiat rules like the
quantitative caps seen in Campbell and Baker.1 ' Otherwise, the legal
process is inherently risky as to outcomes on liability and damages. A
meritorious case is always subject to uncertainty of outcome."' With perfect
bilateral omniscience, all cases would settle under the terms dictated by the
predicted winner; with perfect single-party omniscience, virtually all cases
would go to trial because the omniscient party would not settle for anything
less than the winning outcome net of transaction costs. Most cases settle
because uncertainty is the governing condition. Uncertainty is a fact of life,
and variance of outcomes is a routine feature of the litigation system.11 9
The real policy issues are what is the role of variance with respect to pu-
nitive damages, and what degree of variability is acceptable or good? Here,
empirical scholarship does not provide the answer. As Eisenberg comments,
"How much variation to allow is a question of judgment and policy." 2 ' A
normative theory of variance in punitive damages is needed.
Outlier judgments are unpredictable.121 Outliers have two attributes.
First, the awards are low frequency events. Low frequency is defined here as
small probabilities of occurrence based on the class of all cases awarding
punitive damages. Since punitive damages are awarded infrequently,2 2 a
low frequency award is an outlier of the small class of cases (i.e., they are an
infrequent occurrence within a set of infrequent events).
Second, outlier awards are low frequency events because they are high
severity losses. High severity is defined here as the high dollar value of an
115. See Theodore Eisenberg, Commentary on "On the Nature of Bankruptcy": Bank-
ruptcy and Bargaining, 75 VA. L. REV. 205, 210 (1989) ("When both parties agree on the
outcome of a dispute there is little reason to litigate."). It has long been recognized that in
legal analysis "certainty generally is illusion." Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law,
10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 466 (1897).
116. See Interview with Kenneth Arrow, Professor, Stanford University, in Three Nobel
Laureates on the State of Economics, CHALLENGE, Jan.-Feb. 2000, at 13, 19-20.
117. Cf. Sunstein, Kahneman & Schkade, supra note 7, at 2077, 2126 (arguing that "un-
predictable awards create both unfairness and (on reasonable assumptions) inefficiency" but
that "both caps and multipliers are extremely crude" devices).
118. See Rhee, Price Theory of Legal Bargaining, supra note 26, at 664 ("It can never be
assumed that parties should try to accurately predict the decision of the deliberative body
because this assumes a level of predictive power beyond the credible allowance of a rational
person.").
119. George L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputes for Litigation, 13 J.
LEGAL STUD. 1, 16-19 (1984).
120. Eisenberg et al. 1997, supra note 17, at 653.
121. See Sunstein, Kahneman & Schkade, supra note 7, at 2077 (noting the problem of
"a risk of extremely high awards").
122. See supra note 103.
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award of punitive damages relative to the defendant firm's wealth. Similar to
the concept of the marginal utility of money, the same amount of money has
different effects depending on a corporate defendant's wealth. High dollar
values in absolute terms are not necessarily a high severity award. The $2
million award in Gore is not a large number for a national firm like BMW,
but it could be a devastating sum for a smaller firm. Another example: if
compensatory damages are $20 billion, say hypothetically for harms related
to British Petroleum's oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico, would a $20 billion
award of punitive damages be so shocking'? Likewise, a high multiple does
not necessarily lead to a high severity award. Suppose the compensatory
damage award is minimal, say $100, and punitive damages are awarded at a
90x multiple ($9,000). Would such a case have merited the attention of the
Supreme Court'? Thus, neither a high multiple nor a large absolute value of
punitive damages nor both is necessarily problematic.
The rare cases yield a low frequency, high severity award, and thus they
are unpredictable. A high severity award exceeds the boundary of ordinary
expectation because it imposes financial distress on firms. 123 Financial dis-
tress, such as insolvency, substantially disrupts a firm's ordinary operations. It
has significant economic consequences and imposes significant economic
costs, including the liability amount and the costs associated with disruptions
to the firm's operations, transaction costs associated with recapitalization, and
insolvency. Moreover, actual awards are not the only economic detriment. The
risk of being subject to a low frequency, high severity award has implications
on settlement. Implied, but not stated, in Baker is that outlier judgments may
coerce settlements, force overpayment, and thus overdeter defendants.
124
A summary of the essential problem is helpful. The supposed problem of
unpredictability is too general a proposition. Unpredictability is tied to the
problem of variance. While most awards of punitive damages are predictable
within a range of expectation, a small class of awards is highly unpredictable
and economically harmful because the awards exceed the range of ordinary
expectation as to frequency and severity. Problematic awards occur infre-
quently. Infrequent events are harmful because they pose severe economic
consequences. When an award meets these conditions, it is defined as a low
frequency, high severity award. Such extraordinary awards can be like a
lightning strike, infrequent as to occurrence and severe as to outcome. 125 The
risk associated with these cases affects the whole of the tort and dispute res-
olution systems.
123. See Viscusi, supra note 17, at 285 ("The high stakes and high variability of punitive
damage awards are of substantial concern to companies, as punitive damages may pose a
catastrophic threat of corporate insolvency.").
124. Sharkey, supra note 5, at 26.
125. See Koenig, supra note 29, at 174 ("Plaintiffs are depicted as filing needless suits
for the chance of winning a 'lightning strike' punitive damages payout.").
October 2012]
Michigan Law Review
II. LAW AND ECONOMICS THEORY AND CRITIQUE
A. Standard Law and Economics Theory
The standard law and economics theory of punitive damages advances
deterrence as the normative goal. The law should optimally deter defendants
by causing them to internalize the full cost of all wrongful conduct.126 This
basic idea originates from Judge Learned Hand's famous exposition of the
negligence standard in United States v. Carroll Towing Co. 2 The economic
theory of punitive damages is based on the idea of minimizing social cost
through optimal deterrence.
128
The leading proponents of this theory are Mitchell Polinsky and Steven
Shavell. They argue that punitive damages should only be awarded if a de-
fendant has a chance to escape liability for the harm it causes. 129 When the
tort system operates perfectly in imposing liability for all wrongful conduct,
there is no reason for punitive damages since defendants fully internalize the
cost of wrongful conduct. Only when a defendant can escape liability should
punitive damages be awarded in an amount equal to the escaped liability as
a means of preventing the underdeterrence of wrongful conduct. From this
perspective, when a defendant has a chance of escaping liability for wrong-
ful conduct, the total damages should be the harm caused multiplied by the
reciprocal of the probability of being found liable.130 This concept can be
expressed in a mathematical formula: D = H x 1 where D is the total dam-P
ages award, H is the magnitude of the harm, and P is the probability of
being found liable. 31 The key point here is that a defendant should pay a
liability amount in excess of the compensatory damages equal to the amount
of the harm the defendant caused for which he would not otherwise pay.
3 2
126. Calandrillo, supra note 17, at 779 80; Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 17, at 873
74.
127. 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947).
128. See Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 17, at 883 n.31 (extending the Hand Formula
analysis to a theory of punitive damages); see also Sebok, supra note 17, at 977 ("Polinsky
and Shavell, who have put forward the purest and most straightforward account of punitive
damages and efficient deterrence, view punitive damages as an extension of the Hand Test
used in negligence.").
129. Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 17, at 874.
130. Id.; see also Calandrillo, supra note 17, at 780.
131. Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 17, at 889 n.48. Since total damage D equals com-
pensatory damage for the harm H plus punitive damages E, punitive damages can be stated as:
£- H (I - 1) where the term (I - 1) is the punitive damages multiplier. Id. at 890 n.5 1.
132. Polinsky and Shavelldo not expect the multiplier to yield high multiples in most
cases. Id. at 891-92. To reduce the evidentiary and decisionmaking burdens, they recommend
providing a jury with probabilities in increments of one-tenths. Id. at 892. Thus, the low end of
the probability of being found liable (0.1 or 10 percent) yields a multiple of 9x compensatory
damages-which coincidentally is the upper limit of the cap in Campbell.
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The standard law and economics theory is seen at work in Mathias v.
Accor Economy Lodging, Inc.'33 There, the plaintiffs suffered bedbug bites
while staying at the defendant's motel. The jury awarded each plaintiff
$5,000 in compensatory damages and $186,000 in punitive damages, a mul-
tiple of 37.2x. 134 Judge Posner rejected the defendant's argument that the
punitive damages violated Gore and Campbell:
The hotel's attempt to pass off the bedbugs as ticks, which some guests
might ignorantly have thought less unhealthful, may have postponed the
instituting of litigation to rectify the hotel's misconduct. The award of pu-
nitive damages in this case thus serves the additional purpose of limiting
the defendant's ability to profit from its fraud by escaping detection and
(private) prosecution. If a tortfeasor is "caught" only half the time he
commits torts, then when he is caught he should be punished twice as
heavily in order to make up for the times he gets away.
1
1
5
The court affirmed the award of punitive damages on the basis that the
defendant had escaped liability in many other transactions with motel cus-
tomers, which justified an upward deviation from Campbell. Thus, Mathias
adopts the standard law and economics reasoning that escaped culpable
conduct must be "recaptured" through the imposition of punitive damages
such that the cost of a defendant's activity is fully internalized.
B. Critique of the Standard Theory
Despite the mathematical elegance of the standard law and economics
theory, the model is incomplete from the standpoint of how punitive damag-
es should work. Escaped liability is an important factor to consider from a
deterrence perspective. It is well known that many legitimate claims go un-
discovered or are not pursued for various reasons,'36 and thus defendants
"internalize far less than the full cost of the losses they inflict." 131 But the
standard law and economics model fails to account for other important vari-
ables in the tort and litigation systems.
133. 347 E3d 672 (7th Cir. 2003) (Posner, J.).
134. Mathias, 347 E 3d at 674.
135. Id. at 677.
136. See ToM BAKER, THE MEDICAL MALPRACTICE MYTH 68-69 (2005); DEBORAH R.
HENSLER ET AL., RAND INST. FOR CIVIL JUSTICE, COMPENSATION FOR ACCIDENTAL INJURIES
IN THE UNITED STATES 142 (1991); Marc A. Franklin et al., Accidents, Money, and the Law: A
Study of the Economics of Personal Injury Litigation, 61 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 10 (1961); John
C.R Goldberg, Twentieth- Century Tort Theory, 91 GEO. L.J. 513, 554 (2003); Michael J. Saks,
Do We Really Know Anything About the Behavior of the Tort Litigation System-And Why
Not?, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 1147, 1183 (1992).
137. Saks, supra note 136, at 1283 n.533; see also Keith N. Hylton, Litigation Costs and
the Economic Theory of Tort Law, 46 U. MIAMI L. REV. 111, 113 14 (1991). Corporate de-
fendants also do not fully internalize the cost of torts due to the rule of limited liability, which
is a subsidy to corporations. See Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, Toward Unlimited
Shareholder Liability for Corporate Torts, 100 YALE L.J. 1879, 1916 23 (1991); David W.
Leebron, Limited Liability, Tort Victims, and Creditors, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 1565 (1991); Rob-
ert J. Rhee, Bonding Limited Liability, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1417, 1433-35 (2010).
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In the empirical world, litigation involves risk, and the parties are the
risk bearers. Kip Viscusi provides the following critique of law and econom-
ics analysis:
The standard economic theory of punitive damages and incentives casts the
analysis within a highly stylized situation of certainty. Does the economic
value of the definite harm resulting from an action exceed the benefits?
The task then becomes setting a damage amount so that the company rec-
ognizes the full costs of its actions and exercises an appropriate degree of
care in its activities. These formulations are overly simplistic, however, be-
cause they neglect potential risks that affect corporate actions and the
linkage of the company's behavior to the societal effects .... To under-
stand fully what legal sanctions may be appropriate when corporate
decisions generate social harms, it is necessary to explicitly account for the
tradeoffs inherent in corporate risk decisionmaking."8
Like the Hand Formula, the standard law and economics model of puni-
tive damages is built on the edifice of probability and expected value. But
the model fails to account for the role of risk in the decisionmaking of par-
ties.
Probability and variance are entirely different concepts. 139 To illustrate,
assume two coin flips: in coin flip A, one gets $20 if the coin is heads and
$0 if it is tails; in coin flip B, one gets $40 if the coin is heads and one must
pay $20 if it is tails. For both coin flips A and B, the expected value based
on the probabilities is $10. However, it is obvious that the variances of the
two coin flips are different. In coin flip A, the outcomes are [$20, $0] for a
spread of $20, and in coin flip B, the outcomes are [$40, $20] for a spread of
$60. The greater the spread of potential outcomes, the greater the risk. Here,
coin flip B has more variance, and is thus more risky. A theory of punitive
damages must account for the quality of riskiness of punitive damages.
Another empirical fact is that the litigation system is not composed of
homogenous parties. Heterogeneous parties act under a veil of uncertainty
and react differently to both similar and dissimilar circumstances. The most
important difference among parties is that defendants who are exposed to
the largest punitive damage awards are typically corporations, whereas most
plaintiffs are individuals. Corporate defendants and individual plaintiffs
view and manage risks differently. The former are repeat players in the liti-
gation system. The outcomes of individual lawsuits do not affect the
portfolio of corporations for the most part. On the other hand, the outcome
of the lawsuit for an individual plaintiff is significant. By virtue of different
circumstances, the degrees of variance experienced by the different classes
138. Viscusi, supra note 17, at 299 (footnote omitted). "The implicit message of the
economic model is that we do not need to be concerned about the high proportion of cases that
are settled because the outcomes of settled cases approximate the positions the parties would
have occupied after a trial on the merits." Janet Cooper Alexander, Do the Merits Matter? A
Study of Settlements in Securities Class Actions, 43 STAN. L. REV. 497, 502 (1991).
139. THE PRINCETON COMPANION TO MATHEMATICS 265 (Timothy Gowers ed., 2008).
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of plaintiffs and defendants are different. Yet the standard law and econom-
ics model of punitive damages does not account for this difference.
140
If most defendants are corporations, punitive damages and the threat of
outlier verdicts must affect corporate finance and risk management, and
these factors may affect litigation behavior. Punitive damages can threaten
the solvency of firms, require firms to recapitalize lost capital, and otherwise
affect the firm's operations just as any large liability or incurred business
cost can. These financial effects must be modeled into an economic theory
of punitive damages.
Lastly, in the litigation system, most cases settle. 141 Dispute resolution
scholars claim that settlement occurs "in the shadow of the law."142 Settle-
ment is the large unseen part of the tort system because most disputes are
privately ordered. 143 Settlement is irrelevant to the efficiency aspiration of
the law only if the aggregate outcomes in settlement reflect the probabilistic
value of trial outcomes. 144 Settlements may distort the efficiency aspiration
of tort law, thus undermining efficiency and imposing social cost. 145 Tort
theory exists in the shadow of settlement, and "[i]ts efficiency aspiration
can be achieved only within a system that settles most disputes." 146 Many
scholars have recognized the issue-what is the effect of settlement prac-
tices on punitive damages, and vice versa? 141 Yet the standard law and
economics model does not account for any potential difference between
140. Polinsky and Shavell's model assumes risk-neutral parties and diversified share-
holders. Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 17, at 886-87.
141. See Alexander, supra note 138, at 525 (noting the settlement rate is likely 60% 70%);
Gillian K. Hadfield, Where Have All the Trials Gone? Settlements, Nontrial Adjudications,
and Statistical Artifacts in the Changing Disposition of Federal Civil Cases, 1 J. EMPIRICAL
LEGAL STUD. 705, 730 tbl.7 (noting that 68.7% of federal civil cases in 2000 were settled);
see also Marc Galanter, The Vanishing Trial: An Examination of Trials and Related Matters in
Federal and State Courts, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 459, 462 63 tbl.1 (2004) (noting the
civil trial rate in federal court in 2002 to be 1.8%); Saks, supra note 136, at 1212-13 (noting
trial rate of less than 10%).
142. Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law:
The Case of Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950 (1979).
143. See LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 357, 363 (3d ed.
2005) (explaining that the study of appellate cases can be quite misleading because it is "the
tip of a huge iceberg of cases"); Koenig, supra note 29, at 172; Rhee, supra note 35, at 127;
Saks, supra note 136, at 1212 ("The focus on trials is somewhat misplaced, because the great
majority of cases are settled, not tried.").
144. Alexander, supra note 138, at 499; Rhee, supra note 35, at 136 37; see also Rich-
ard A. Posner, A Theory of Negligence, I J. LEGAL STUD. 29 (1972) (arguing that common law
courts set the efficient level of liability through the cost-benefit analysis embedded in the
Hand Formula).
145. Bruce L. Hay & Kathryn E. Spier, Settlement of Litigation, in 3 THE NEW PAL-
GRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAW: 442, 447 (Peter Newman ed., 1998); Rhee,
supra note 35, at 129; Kathryn E. Spier, A Note on the Divergence Between the Private and
Social Motive to Settle Under a Negligence Rule, 26 J. LEGAL STUD. 613, 614-16 (1997); see
also Alexander, supra note 138, at 501-23.
146. Rhee, supra note 35, at 127.
147. See supra note 29.
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settlement and trial, and the potential effects of punitive damages on either
settlement rates or amounts.
In summary, variance is an important empirical fact of the litigation sys-
tem. Even a normative model cannot disengage from reality and must
account for how the litigation system really works and parties really behave.
An economic theory of punitive damages should incorporate the realities of
risk, risk management, and corporate finance into a model of how punitive
damages actually work and how they should work.
C. Toward a Complete Theory of Optimal Liability
Optimal deterrence is achieved through nothing less than full cost inter-
nalization. 48 The standard law and economics model concerns escaped
liability, but it does not consider other more important factors in the pricing
of legal disputes in the settlement process. The threat of punitive damages
plays an important role in regulating the value of tort actions, and it can
produce inefficiencies through over- or underdeterrence.
Punitive damages may impose too much legal liability or economic cost
on defendants arising from the litigation. In addition to the cash value of
legal liability, the threat and the uncertainty of punitive damages create fi-
nancial costs that function very much like economic penalties for wrongful
conduct. Firms can go insolvent. Their cost of equity can increase, resulting
in reduced stock value. If a firm must be recapitalized after a large judg-
ment, it could bear the large transaction costs of raising capital. Factoring in
information about the adverse litigation outcome, the new capital may cost
more. Collectively, these economic costs must be factored into the calculus
of cost internalization and deterrence.
With respect to the cost of legal liability, the method of calculating the
amount of "cost" imposed on the tortfeasor must be explored. The cost of
liability must be conceptualized in two ways because it is calculated under
two different methods: the parties calculate cost in private settlement, and
the court calculates it in public adjudication. If these valuational methods
produce approximately the same results, there would be no issue. However,
scholars have recognized that settlement practices may create social costs
and undermine optimal deterrence when valuations diverge. 149 For reasons
explained in the next Part, the private cost calculations in settlement diverge
from the public calculations of courts. The idea of efficient deterrence is
implicitly based on the judicial standard of measuring cost; after all, courts
determine the legal standards under which cases are decided. If so, we must
explore how the possibility of punitive damages affects settlement values,
and whether these values are consistent with the expected value of judicial
outcomes. In other words, does the threat of punitive damages increase or
decrease settlement value from the reference point of risk neutrality and
expected value of trial outcomes?
148. Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 17, at 873; Sharkey, supra note 17, at 365.
149. See infra Section III.B.
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An economic theory of punitive damages should advance the policy goal
of full cost internalization. Achieving this objective requires implementing
several instrumental goals: (1) mitigating escaped liability and deterring
recidivism, (2) factoring the financial and economic costs of punitive dam-
ages on defendants, and (3) accounting for deviations from judicial
valuations in settlement practices. The standard law and economics theory is
already well developed with respect to the problem of escaped liability
and recidivism. Economic theory must now account for the more im-
portant factors affecting litigation behavior and valuation. The Supreme
Court in Baker suggested that punitive damages cast a "shadow" on set-
tlement 50 but found variance to be a bad thing.' 5' Parts III and IV analyze
these unresolved aspects of punitive damages. They present a financial
economic analysis of variance and punitive damages, and its relationship
to settlement.
III. RISK ARBITRAGE IN SETTLEMENTS
A. Corporations as Defendants
An inquiry into the relationship between punitive damages and settle-
ment requires that we first consider the heterogeneous risk profiles of the
litigating parties. The economic interests of corporations are at the center of
the debate on punitive damages. Businesses constitute an overwhelming
proportion of defendants in tort actions. 1 2 The punitive damages debate
concerns the wealth and well-being of corporations and raises larger eco-
nomic issues. 1 3 Corporations are vital to the national economy, and they
represent large aggregations of the nation's wealth.'54 The Court has
150. Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471,498 n.15 (2008).
151. Id. at 500-01; see also Koenig, supra note 29, at 208-09 (arguing that almost no
systematic knowledge exists as to the effect of punitive damages on settlement).
152. It has long been recognized that a principal concern of the field of torts is business
interests. See Holmes, supra note 115, at 467 ("But the torts with which our courts are kept
busy to-day are mainly the incidents of certain well known businesses."). Even in the modern
era, a majority of tort cases involve organizational or institutional defendants. Samuel R.
Gross & Kent D. Syverud, Don't Try: Civil Jury Verdicts in a System Geared to Settlement, 44
UCLA L. REV. 1, 19-20 (1996) (noting that most nonvehicular tort cases were against large
businesses or governments); see also Gillian K. Hadfield, Exploring Economic and Democrat-
ic Theories of Civil Litigation: Differences Between Individual and Organizational Litigants
in the Disposition of Federal Civil Cases, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1275, 1298 (2005) (noting that in
2000 "fully 60% of federal civil cases involved an individual suing an organizational defend-
ant").
153. See Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 17, at 948 52 (discussing the effect of punitive
damages on corporate defendants); Sharkey, supra note 5, at 36 (noting that corporate and
business interests have led the attack on punitive damages); Viscusi, supra note 17, at 285
(arguing that punitive damages pose a threat of corporate insolvency).
154. See generally, ADOLF A. BERLE & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORA-
TION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY (1991).
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explicitly recognized the importance of corporate economic interests.155
Frank Easterbrook has famously asserted that "[t]he Supreme Court is a
regulator.' 5 6 Judge Easterbrook's assertion rings true in the area of punitive
damages, which itself has a large impact on corporate enterprises. 57 There
can be no doubt that the larger policy concerns regarding corporate wealth,
redistribution, and economic regulation underlie the constitutional debate.
Several law and economics scholars have suggested that punitive dam-
ages do not deter corporations.158 Polinsky and Shavell have argued that "the
imposition of punitive damages on firms may not lead to the punishment of
blameworthy individuals within them; thus, the goal of punishing blame-
worthy employees may not be well promoted by imposing punitive damages
on firms."' 59 This argument is consistent with the law and economics theory
that the firm is nothing more than a nexus of contracts 60 and the viewpoint
that diminishes the existence of the firm as an entity of independent signifi-
cance.6 So the argument seems to go, since the corporation is "just a
relatively stable comer of the market in which autonomous property owners
freely contract,'" 62 deterrence is more effective when it imposes targeted
liability on the culpable autonomous person within that nexus of contracts
rather than on the firm which has been anthropomorphized to bear inde-
pendent social responsibility for its harmful actions.
This argument, however, is unpersuasive. Corporations as firms are de-
terred by stiff penalties. We saw the deterrence effect in action in Gore. The
undisclosed repairs were done pursuant to company policy, but immediately
after the jury's verdict of $4 million in punitive damages the company
changed its policy to make full disclosure. 63 Firms respond to costs and
risks, and perhaps do so more rationally than individual persons. The group
of autonomous individuals is collectively deterred by punitive damages, and
155. See supra Section l.A.
156. Frank H. Easterbrook, The Supreme Court, 1983 Term Foreword: The Court and
the Economic System, 98 HARV. L. REV. 4, 4 (1984).
157. See Jeffrey Rosen, Keynote Address, Santa Clara Law Review Symposium: Big
Business and the Roberts Court, 49 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 929, 933-35 (2009) (arguing that
the Supreme Court has favored business and corporate interests); Jeffrey Rosen, Supreme
Court Inc., N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 16, 2008, at MM38 (same); see also Epstein, Landes & Posner,
supra note 95, at 2 (noting statistically significant pro-business trend in the Roberts Court
from 2005 to 2009).
158. E.g., Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 17; see, e.g., Viscusi, supra note 17.
159. Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 17, at 949.
160. FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF
CORPORATE LAW 12 (1991). This idea in the legal academy traces its pedigree to R.H. Coase,
The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386 (1937). See also Michael C. Jensen & William H.
Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure,
3 J. FIN. EcON. 305, 311 (1976) (arguing that the firm "is simply one form of legal fiction
which serves as a nexus for contracting relationships").
161. William T. Allen, Our Schizophrenic Conception of the Business Corporation, 14
CARDOZO L. REV. 261, 265 (1992).
162. Id.
163. BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559,563, 566 (1996).
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the deterrence is more effective because collective liability produces a set of
consensus decisions as to the corporation's future activities and necessary
monitoring within the firm. Moreover, the question of fairness-whether
innocent shareholders and customers should be made to pay punitive dam-
ages-is irrelevant in an economic analysis of the firm. The corporate form
bundles and packages the risks of the firm's activities, and legal liability is
simply one component of the larger business risk.164 Corporations exist in a
tort system that imposes vicarious liability on firms.165
However, the corporation as a tort defendant raises real economic issues.
First, there is the issue of social wealth redistribution from the corporate
enterprise to plaintiffs.'66 Second, corporations are repeat players in the tort
market whereas plaintiffs are single-shot players, 167 and this difference is
important in modeling the dynamics of settlement. Third, corporations as
defendants also implicate corporate finance and risk management issues. A
theory of how punitive damages should work must take into account these
empirical facts.
A financial economic analysis requires a careful assessment of the risk
posed by punitive damages and how heterogeneous parties standing in dif-
ferent circumstances price that risk into the value of the litigation as part of
the settlement process. In this respect, risk is categorized into two broad
categories: ordinary and catastrophic.
B. Risk Arbitrage in Ordinary Cases
In most cases, punitive damages are an ordinary cost of doing business.
Liability is modeled and monitored, costs are budgeted, and risks are man-
aged through retention, insurance, and mitigation. Ordinary risk is the risk
of a loss within the normal, expected range of losses, and such loss does not
financially distress a firm or create significant problems for corporate fi-
nancing. This risk can encompass large sums and high multiples since a
corporation can face large judgments on a routine basis.
When liability is ordinary, the corporate defendant will usually have a
risk arbitrage opportunity. In most ordinary cases, corporate defendants de-
mand and receive a risk premium from the plaintiff. This is a bad thing
because it systematically reduces settlement value from the benchmark of
the expected trial outcome. This arbitrage is made possible for three rea-
sons: (1) risk aversion, (2) repeat play and portfolio variance, and
(3) opportunity cost.
164. "The reason for holding shareholders liable is simple: they have purchased the right
to residual return." Rhee, supra note 137, at 1424.
165. See Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 14-15 (1991) (holding that firms
can be held vicariously liable for punitive damages under the doctrine of respondeat superior).
166. See Del Rossi & Viscusi, supra note 17, at 124 25 (noting 100 punitive damage
awards of $100 million or more from 1985 to 2008, totaling $124.78 billion).
167. See Marc Galanter, Why the "Haves" Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits
of Legal Change, 9 L. & Soc'y REV. 95, 97 (1974).
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Risk aversion. Most natural persons are risk averse. 68 They will pay
money to eliminate or transfer risk to a willing risk bearer, which is the
raison d'6tre of the insurance industry. 169 The academic discipline of fi-
nancial economics and the modern capital markets is based on the
fundamental assumption that investors are risk averse and thus must be
paid to bear economic risk for loaning capital. 70 Risk aversion among
most people is a plain fact of the dispute resolution system.
In contrast, corporations are generally considered risk neutral. Although
they may sometimes behave as if they were risk averse,'' they generally
strive to operate in a risk-neutral fashion.'2 Risk-neutral decisions maxim-
ize expected return whereas risk-averse decisions sacrifice expected return
for certain outcomes.' 73 If a shareholder maintains a diversified portfolio of
stocks, she benefits from risk-neutral decisions even when some stocks in
the portfolio suffer significant losses due to risky decisions.
This difference in risk preference has an important implication: risk-
averse plaintiffs will accept a sum certain that is less than the expected value
of variable outcomes. Settlement represents a sum certain whereas trial rep-
resents liability or no-liability outcomes. A simple example illustrates the
point. If trial represents an equal probability of liability and no liability with
a spread of [100, 0], a risk-averse plaintiff may accept a discounted settle-
ment of 40 rather than the expected value of 50 for the benefit of eliminating
the risk of trial.' Viewing the probabilities and risks similarly, a risk-
neutral defendant will pay up to 50, but if it knows that the plaintiff is risk
averse and is thus willing to take less than the expected value, a settlement
will be had in the range of 40 to 50. All else being equal, the risk-averse party
fares worse in settlement than the risk-neutral party because the former will
concede additional value from the expected value to eliminate the risk of an
168. See Price v. Marshall Erdman & Assocs., Inc., 966 F.2d 320, 327 (7th Cir. 1992)
(Posner, J.); Rhee, supra note 78, at 89.
169. Because insurers have expenses and require a profit, premiums include the actuarial
value of losses plus operating expenses and profits. This "loading charge" is in the range of
10% 50% of the premium. SCOTT E. HARRINGTON & GREGORY R. NIEHAUS, RISK MANAGE-
MENT AND INSURANCE 170 (2d ed. 2004).
170. See Markowitz, supra note 34.
171. Corporations can sometimes behave like risk-averse persons. Rhee, supra note 35,
at 153. Risk aversion may manifest through the decisions of risk-averse managers. Id. at 152;
Koenig, supra note 29, at 170. Corporations buy insurance like a risk-averse entity, but they do
so because insurance may provide real financial and economic advantages that exceed the
negative value of fairly priced insurance premiums. See HARRINGTON & NIEHAUS, supra note
169, at 171 74; Victor P Goldberg, The Devil Made Me Do It: The Corporate Purchase of
Insurance, 5 REV. L. & EcON. 541 (2009); J.B. Heaton, Settlement Pressure, 25 INT'L REV. L.
& ECON. 264, 272-73 (2005); David Mayers & Clifford W. Smith, Jr., On the Corporate De-
mand for Insurance, 55 J. Bus. 281 (1982).
172. Rhee, supra note 35, at 152 53.
173. See Joy v. North, 692 F.2d 880, 886 (2d Cir. 1982); STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE,
CORPORATION LAW AND ECONOMICS 259-63 (2002).
174. The same concept explains why a policyholder will pay an insurance premium of
100 when the expected actuarial loss is 75. See supra note 169.
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all-or-nothing variable trial outcome. Since the plaintiff in a tort action is typi-
cally more risk averse, there is a systematic discounting of settlement values
in favor of the corporate defendant.
Repeat play and portfolio variance. A corporate defendant is able to
mitigate its risk exposure by holding a basket of lawsuits. Companies like
State Farm or BMW are repeat players while plaintiffs like Campbell and
Gore are single-play parties. This difference is important. A single-play par-
ty is exposed to the all-or-nothing aspect of a trial, in itself a risky
proposition. A repeat player does not assume this risk but instead bears the
risk of the portfolio. If a party has 10 suits with equal probability outcomes
of 100 or 0, the variance of this portfolio would be significantly lower than
the variance of a single-shot lawsuit for 100 or 0. A corporate defendant
holding a portfolio of similarly situated cases is exposed to lower risk. In
any specific case, it is not subject to the same type of all-or-nothing vari-
ance. An important caveat is that no single case can substantially affect the
defendant's risk exposure. Barring a catastrophic outlier that can create sig-
nificant deviations from the expected portfolio return, a repeat-play
corporate defendant is exposed to lower risk than is a single-play plaintiff.
Opportunity cost and cost of capital. Plaintiffs and defendants also have
different opportunity costs that yield different settlement values. For a corpo-
ration, the opportunity cost is the firm's cost of capital, which is the average
return expected by the firm's capital providers. Based on the capital asset pric-
ing model, a shareholder with a diversified portfolio earns the market return,
which is approximately 11 percent.17 5 It is beyond the scope of this Article to
delve into the precise workings of a firm's cost of capital, but suffice it to
say that, depending on the riskiness of the firm's cash flow, the cost of capi-
tal will fluctuate around this benchmark market return.
A plaintiff's opportunity cost cannot be calculated with the theoretical
precision we see in the financial markets. Intuitively, however, the oppor-
tunity cost for a tort victim seems higher for different types of tort claims.1
6
If the claim is for a substantial personal injury, the opportunity cost of for-
going settlement may be significant enough to accept an otherwise
unfavorable valuation. If the tort claim is based on economic wrongs, like
the claims in Browing-Ferris, Haslip, TXO, Campbell and Gore, the oppor-
tunity cost of pursuing economic opportunities in business may be higher
when compared to the alternative of pursuing a legal action with an uncer-
tain outcome, a lengthy duration to resolution, and high transaction costs.
Transaction cost in the tort system plays a significant role. The Ameri-
can rule of attorneys' fees, under which parties bear their own attorney fees,
is the rule in tort cases. Contingent fees finance litigation, but considerations
of opportunity cost and the marginal utility of money weigh unfavorably
on individual plaintiffs going up against corporate defendants. Corporate
175. RICHARD A. BREALEY ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE FINANCE 444 (concise 2d
ed. 2011).
176. Cf. O'Shea v. Riverway Towing Co., 677 F.2d 1194, 1199 (7th Cir. 1982) (Posner,
J.) (noting a tort plaintiff's opportunity cost with respect to compensation and lost earnings).
October 2012]
Michigan Law Review
defendants have significantly more resources that they can deploy in litiga-
tion, which positively affects the action's outcome.
17
In summary, when the outcomes are expected and ordinary, risk arbitrage
arises from these effects: (1) plaintiffs are more risk averse, (2) single-play
plaintiffs bear greater risk arising from the trial outcome, and (3) individual
plaintiffs face higher opportunity costs than corporate defendants. The
corporate defendant enjoys a risk arbitrage opportunity, which systematically
lowers private settlement values as compared to valuations achieved in
public adjudications. This difference in values represents a risk arbitrage
opportunity.
Optimal deterrence is judicially set by courts in public adjudication, but
it is undermined by settlement. Courts and juries are not risk averse because
the outcomes do not affect them personally. They are not personally exposed
to the outcomes in the case, and thus the variance from single-play and repeat-
play scenarios are irrelevant to their decisionmaking. The standard law and
economics model states that optimal deterrence is undermined when recidivist
tortfeasors escape liability. When the economics of settlement is considered,
however, the defendant may partially avoid the amount of liability that a court
would set through risk arbitrage, even when his wrongdoing has been discov-
ered and an action is prosecuted. Since most legal disputes settle, the problem
of risk arbitrage is great. In cases of ordinary liability, the law of punitive
damages should seek to mitigate a corporate defendant's risk arbitrage.
C. Risk Arbitrage in Catastrophic Cases
I now consider the effect of catastrophic liability on litigation value.
With ordinary losses, standard risk management methods and corporate fi-
nancing can manage losses even if they are large as to amount or multiple of
compensatory damages. However, catastrophic losses pose special challeng-
es, including the problem of insuring or self-insuring, the financial
implications of bankruptcy and capital raising, and the settlement pressure
associated with a litigation involving a potentially catastrophic loss. When a
defendant is confronted with the threat of catastrophic liability, the risk arbi-
trage opportunity flips in favor of the plaintiff.
Catastrophic losses occur when a judgment is a low frequency, high se-
verity event, meaning that the judgment is an unexpected outlier and a high
severity award relative to the firm's wealth. Such losses can lead to financial
distress, defined here as substantial disruptions in the firm's ordinary opera-
tions resulting from a severe financial loss. Financial distress can result in
recapitalization of lost capital, increased cost of capital, triggering of insol-
vency, and filing for bankruptcy.
The fear of unexpected high severity awards, though such awards are
highly unlikely, can affect corporate decisionmaking at settlement. One
177. See Albert Yoon, The Importance qfLitigant Wealth, 59 DEPAUL L. REV. 649, 652
(2010).
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commentator notes the complaints of tort reformers and business interest
lobbyists:
Punitive damages claims are viewed as exerting unfair bargaining power
against corporate defendants. A Washington lobbyist for a coalition of
business and manufacturing groups, states that: "[t]he biggest problem
we have with punitive damage claims is that they are used as a lever for
out-of-court settlements." The argument of tort reformers is that our civil
litigation crisis is due in part to marginal cases that would never be brought
without the possibility of punitive damages.'78
These arguments may be self-serving, but they are not without merit.
The basic idea is that plaintiffs can use the risk of a severe punitive damages
award, however unlikely that award is, to extract a risk premium in settle-
ment, and thus settlement values deviate upwards from expected judicial
outcomes.
If corporations are risk neutral, why would they pay a risk premium in
excess of the probabilistic value of the expected punitive damages award?
An insurance and risk transfer analysis provides one way to think about the
economic cost of catastrophic risk. The measure of financial cost borne by a
firm subject to punitive liability can be indirectly inferred from the pricing
of catastrophic risk transfer in the insurance market. In other words, if a risk
transfer mechanism were available, such as third-party insurance for cata-
strophic punitive damages, how would this risk transfer be priced?
There is no general insurance solution to the problem of punitive dam-
ages. Most courts hold that public policy proscribes insurance coverage for
punitive damages liability arising from an intentional tort. '19 Courts are split
on the question of whether punitive damage liability is insurable for reck-
less, wanton, or grossly negligent conduct.8 0 Absent insurance or an
alternative method to transfer the risk of punitive damages, a defendant
must retain the risk.' Risk retention is the default method of financing
loss. Another way to manage the risk is self-insurance, which is a formal
178. Koenig, supra note 29, at 173-74 (alteration in original) (footnotes omitted).
179. ROBERT H. JERRY, II & DOUGLAS R. RICHMOND, UNDERSTANDING INSURANCE LAW
547-48 (4th ed. 2007); ROBERT E. KEETON & ALAN I. WIDISS, INSURANCE LAW 495 (student
ed. 1988); see, e.g., Pins v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 476 F.3d 581 (8th Cir. 2007). The
basic rationale is that "a person should not be permitted to insure against harms he may inten-
tionally" inflict or to profit there from. Home Ins. Co. v. Neilsen, 332 N.E.2d 240, 244 (Ind.
Ct. App. 1975). But see Tom Baker, Reconsidering Insurance for Punitive Damages, 1998
WIs. L. REV. 101, 101-02 (arguing for the insurability of punitive damages).
180. JERRY & RICHMOND, supra note 179, at 550. Compare Shelton Mut. Ins. Co. v.
Dale, 914 So. 2d 698 (Miss. 2005) (recognizing insurability of punitive damages), with Ros-
enbloom v. Flygare, 501 N.W.2d 597 (Minn. 1993) (declining to permit insuring of punitive
damages).
181. "There are four broad methods to finance loss: (1) retention, (2) insurance, (3)
hedging, and (4) other contractual risk transfer." HARRINGTON & NIEHAUS, supra note 169, at
I1; see EMMETT J. VAUGHAN & THERESE VAUGHAN, FUNDAMENTALS OF RISK AND INSUR-
ANCE 17-18 (9th ed. 2003) (discussing risk retention).
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financial plan established by the risk bearer to fund losses."8 2 Self-insurance
can be funded internally from the firm's cash flow or assets, or externally
through borrowing or the sale of stock."8 3 For corporate defendants, risk
retention or a more formal self-insurance program can cover large punitive
damages as long as they are not severe amounts.
When financial loss is potentially catastrophic, it begets a problem of
economic feasibility of risk transfer or retention.1 4 Insurance economists
have shown that catastrophic risks pose higher capital costs than ordinary
risks." 5 Insurance premium is determined as P = E(S) + K + R where E(S) is
the expected value of the claim, K is the operating expenses, and "R is a risk
premium which allows for coverage of unforeseen deviations in the claims
amount to be paid." ' 6 The basic problem is that the risk premium R be-
comes very high when the potential loss is catastrophic. To mitigate the risk
of insolvency, an insurer must hold capital sufficient to protect against a low
frequency, high severity event. Ordinarily, capital is held in an amount suffi-
cient to fund a firm's activities. When additional capital is held only for the
purpose of protecting against a low frequency, high severity event, an insur-
er must charge sufficient premiums to give the capital providers a sufficient
rate of return.1 7 This results in premiums that can be much higher than the
expected loss.
A stylized example illustrates the point. First consider high frequency,
low severity risks. Assume the expected cost is 500 with a range of 400 to
600, an investment yield of 8% on premiums, a tax rate of 25% no overhead
costs, and a cost of capital of 15%, which is the rate of return that capital
providers expect. The insurer charges a premium of 500 and maintains capi-
tal of 100. Thus, premium and capital can cover losses at the high end of the
range of expectations (600) and ensure claims payment and solvency of the
firm. Losses are highly frequent and in small amounts. With even distribu-
tion of losses and claims paid throughout the year, the premium of 500 earns
pretax investment income of 20 (= 500 + 2 x 8%), with net profit of 15 on
capital held of 100. This meets the 15% cost of capital. When a risk is high
frequency and low severity per these assumptions, policyholders pay 500 of
182. HARRINGTON & NIEHAUS, supra note 169, at 11.
183. Id.
184. See Robert J. Rhee, Terrorism Risk in a Post-9/11 Economy: The Convergence of
Capital Markets, Insurance, and Government Action, 37 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 435, 474-78 (2005)
(discussing the economic feasibility of insuring catastrophic risks).
185. See Scott E. Harrington & Greg Niehaus, Government Insurance, Tax Policy, and
the Affordability and Availability of Catastrophic Insurance, 19 J. INS. REG. 591 (2001); see
also CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, FEDERAL REINSURANCE FOR DISASTERS 3 (2002) (discussing the
insurability problem of catastrophic risks).
186. ERIC BRIYS & FRANCOIS DE VARENNE, INSURANCE: FROM UNDERWRITING To DE-
RIVATIVES 6 (2001).
187. Rhee, supra note 184, at 474 76; see Harrington & Niehaus, supra note 185, at
595-99.
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premium for an expected loss of 500, which is a premium-to-expected loss
ratio of 1:1.111
Now consider low frequency, high severity risks. The risk is a 1-in-20
year event with a loss of 10,000. The actuarial risk in any given year is 500,
but the insurer must hold capital of 10,000 to ensure claims payment and
solvency. If the insurer charges the expected actuarial loss of 500 as premi-
um, the pretax investment income is 40 and net profit is 30.189 The premium
is earned profit since in most years there are no claims, and after taxes the
earned premium yields an additional profit of 375. Total profit on underwrit-
ing and investment is 405, which is a paltry 4.05% return on a capital of
10,000. To earn a 15% rate of return, the insurer must have a net profit of
1,500. The net income deficiency of 1,095 (or 10.95% additional required
return) must be recovered through additional premiums charged. This re-
quires an additional premium of 1,352 on top of the 500 actuarial loss.190 A
total premium of 1,852 yields net investment income of Ill and net under-
writing profit of 1,389, for a total net profit of 1,500, which is a 15% return
on capital of 10,000. When a risk is low frequency and high severity per
these assumptions, policyholders pay 1,852 of premium for an expected loss
of 500, which is a premium multiple of 3.7x expected loss. Economically
feasible risk transfer rationally occurs at multiples of the expected value of
the loss. The price of transferring catastrophic risk is high.
Insurance economists have shown that as risk decreases in frequency
and increases in severity, premiums increase nonlinearly. The figure below
shows this effect.' 91
188. In the actual world, premiums cannot be 1:1 because there would be a loading
charge, which would include expenses. See supra note 169.
189. It is not 20 as in the previous example because the premiums are not being paid
back to policyholders in most years as claims paid.
190. This is calculated as follows: 1,095 = P x (1 .25) + P x (.08 x (1 .25)). When this
equation is calculated, premium P = 1,352.
191. See Harrington & Niehaus, supra note 185, at 598 fig. 1.
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FIGURE 1
PREMIUMS AS A NONLINEAR FUNCTION OF RISK
i
Expected actuarial loss
Probability of Loss
Since premium represents the price of risk transfer, it represents the fi-
nancial cost of bearing catastrophic risk. Expected value and risk are
different. When risk is transferred through the insurance mechanism, it must
be priced. The more catastrophic the risk, the more insurers must charge
premiums that are greater than the actuarial loss. Catastrophic risks have
significant implications for the financial and operational aspects of a firm
that must either retain the risk or self-insure. The transfer of punitive dam-
ages liability to an insurer is at best uncertain.
92
Outlier negative outcomes increase the probability of financial distress,
which imposes significant financial and economic costs on the corporation's
constituencies. In addition to substantial professional fees and transaction
costs,' 93 financial distress such as bankruptcy disrupts a firm's operations
and creates real and significant economic costs arising from lost profits, op-
erational disruptions, and express and implicit rearrangement of contractual
relationships with suppliers and customers. 94 Beyond the prospect of insol-
vency, outlier judgments increase the variance of profit and loss. Greater
variability of returns increases the firm's cost of capital since the investment
192. See supra notes 179-180 & accompanying next.
193. The out-of-pocket transaction cost in a bankruptcy is in the range of 3 to 7 percent
of the firm value. See Jerold B. Warner, Bankruptcy Costs: Some Evidence, 32 J. FIN. 337
(1977); Lawrence A. Weiss, Bankruptcy Resolution: Direct Costs and Violation of Priority of
Claims, 27 J. FIN. ECON. 285 (1990); James S. Ang et al., Note, The Administrative Costs of
Corporate Bankruptcy, 37 J. FIN. 219 (1982).
194. See Edward 1. Altman, A Further Empirical Investigation of the Bankruptcy Cost
Question, 39 J. FIN. 1067, 1077 (1984) (reporting lost profits to be 12.2 percent and 23.7 per-
cent of firm value for retail and manufacturing firms); cf David Sunding & David Zilberman,
Consideration of Economics Under California's Porter-Cologne Act, 13 HASTINGS W.-N.W. J.
ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 73, 91 (2007) ("At present, economic theory does not suggest totally satis-
factory, formal measurements of the economic costs of insolvency.").
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opportunity is riskier. Litigation-induced increases in the firm's cost of capi-
tal diminish the company's stock value.195 This decline in stock value is a
real financial cost that stockholders and perhaps even creditors and employ-
ees of the firm bear.
The cost of catastrophic risk is factored into the value of settlements.
The argument is that the threat of catastrophic liability creates "settlement
pressure." Proponents of restricting punitive damages claim that settlements
are overvalued because, fearing an outlier verdict from an out-of-control
jury, corporations will settle at a high price.196
We see an example of how catastrophic litigation risk affects settlement
value and litigation behavior in In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer Inc.9 ' The dis-
trict court there certified a plaintiff class where the plaintiffs averred that the
defendant manufacturer had infected them with HIV-tainted blood prod-
ucts.198 The Seventh Circuit reversed the district court's certification with
Judge Richard Posner noting that a class action would substantially increase
"the sheer magnitude of the risk." '199 In an aggregate action, the turn of for-
tune on a single outcome magnifies variance and exposes the corporation to
great risk. A defendant cannot smooth out the risk by holding a portfolio of
cases, and instead total liability depends on "the outcome of a single jury
trial."200 Since a one-shot bet can put a corporation in danger of insolvency,
the corporation may not wish to stake its existence on a single outcome.
20 1
The corporate defendant is then put "under intense pressure to settle."20 2 For
these reasons, the court in Rhone-Poulenc held that the determination of
liability should "emerge from a decentralized process of multiple trials, in-
volving different juries, and different standards of liability, in different
jurisdictions,1 20 3 necessitating a decertification of the class in favor of indi-
vidual trials.20 4
195. See David M. Cutler & Lawrence H. Summers, The Costs qf Conflict Resolution
and Financial Distress: Evidence from the Texaco-Pennzoil Litigation, 19 RAND J. ECON.
157, 169-70 (1988).
196. See Koenig, supra note 29, at 172-73 ("Tort reformers blame punitive damages for
inflating settlements of dubious claims, a social cost ultimately borne by corporations, con-
sumers, employees and stockholders."); Polinsky, supra note 29, at 671 ("[E]ven if punitive
damage awards at trial are on average insignificant, it does not follow ... that the effect of
punitive damages on settlement is minimal as well.").
197. 51 F.3d 1293 (7th Cir. 1995).
198. Rhone-Poulenc, 51 F.3d at 1296.
199. Id. at 1297.
200. Id. at 1299.
201. See Viscusi, supra note 17, at 285 (noting that punitive damages "may pose a cata-
strophic threat of corporate insolvency").
202. Rhone-Poulenc, 51 F.3d at 1297 98.
203. Id. at 1299.
204. In another article, I criticize the holding in Rhone-Poulenc because, among other
things, "as a matter of equity and fairness, it is unclear why corporate defendants or their
shareholders are entitled to judicial protection from the adverse valuational effects of risk"
when single-shot individual plaintiffs always confront the same problem. Rhee, supra note 35,
at 153.
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The sensitivity to aggregate risk seen in Rhone-Poulenc suggests a di-
rect connection between catastrophic risk and economic value. A class
action is similar to an outlier punitive damages award in that both can im-
pose catastrophic liability. When faced with a catastrophic liability, a
corporate defendant can manage the risk by eliminating the risk. Settle-
ment eliminates litigation risk. In effect, a defendant pays a premium to
eliminate the risk of a "small probability of an immense judgment, '2 05
which is predicted by and consistent with financial economic principles.2 6
Since settlement is an essential aspect of the tort and litigation systems,
these factors of value must also affect the theory of punitive damages.
The key point is this: the pricing of catastrophic risk in the insurance
market reflects the true economic cost of retaining catastrophic risk. A
corporation cannot avoid this cost. If it seeks to eliminate this risk, it must
pay the plaintiff a risk premium at settlement. If it retains this risk, the risk
will manifest in the valuation of the firm. The valuational considerations
of catastrophic legal risk are discussed in the next Section.
D. Case Studies of Texaco-Pennzoil and BP's Gulf Oil Spill
The financial distress associated with punitive damages is illustrated
by the famous case of Pennzoil v. Texaco."' In 1984, Pennzoil filed an ac-
tion for tortious interference with contract, claiming that Texaco by
acquiring Getty Oil had interfered with Pennzoil's prior contract to pur-
chase Getty Oil stock.208 On November 19, 1985, a Texas jury returned the
largest verdict in the history of American litigation: $7.53 billion in com-
pensatory damages and $3 billion in punitive damages. 20 9 Subsequently,
Texaco filed for bankruptcy, and the case eventually settled for $3 billion
in cash. l0 Although this case involved a substantial absolute amount of
punitive damages, the multiple was only 0.4x. The more important point is
that the combined compensatory and punitive awards were so substantial
relative to even Texaco's wealth that it imposed financial distress on the
firm.
This case teaches an important lesson about the economic cost of cata-
strophic legal liability. David Cutler and Lawrence Summers computed the
abnormal stock market returns of Texaco and Pennzoil during the litiga-
tion period.21 ' Their computations showed that the litigation reduced the
combined value of the two companies by $3.4 billion, over 30 percent of
205. Rhone-Poulenc, 51 F3d at 1298.
206. See generally Rhee, supra note 15 (analyzing how parties account for different
perceptions of risk in valuation); Rhee, Price Theory of Legal Bargaining, supra note 26 (ap-
plying financial economics to construct a pricing theory of legal disputes).
207. See Cutler & Summers, supra note 195; Mnookin & Wilson, supra note 33.
208. Mnookin & Wilson, supra note 33, at 296.
209. Id.
210. Id. Mnookin and Wilson provide a detailed history of the case. Id. at 300-09.
211. Cutler & Summers, supra note 195.
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the companies' joint pre-dispute value. 2 12 For every one dollar lost by Tex-
aco, Pennzoil gained only 40 cents.211 This value "leakage" was directly
caused by the litigation.214 A large portion of this loss was restored when
the case finally settled.
215
The chart below records the five-day valuational effects of news re-
garding the litigation and settlement events on the combined value of the
two companies throughout the litigation period.216 In theory, a lawsuit is a
zero-sum game, disregarding transaction cost. The joint value of the two
should decrease only by the amount of transaction cost. However, the
chart below shows that the litigation was not a zero-sum game. It instead
destroyed economic value as measured by the sum value of the two com-
panies.
217
212. Id. at 158.
213. Id.; see also Sanjai Bhagat et al., The Costs of Inefficient Bargaining and Financial
Distress: Evidence from Corporate Lawsuits, 35 J. FIN. ECON. 221, 228 (1994) (confirming
similar results); Kathleen Engelmann & Bradford Cornell, Measuring the Cost of Corporate
Litigation: Five Case Studies, 17 J. LEGAL STUD. 377 (1988) (same).
214. Cutler & Summers, supra note 195, at 158.
215. Id.
216. See id. at 164 fig.1.
217. The data used are from tables I and 2 in the Cutler and Sumners article, and use the
"Five Days After Announcement" combined value figures. Id. at 161-62. The Cutler and
Summers article has a small, insignificant computational error in table 1. The total value lost
in connection with the litigation events sum to $4,291.5 million, and not $4,199.5 million as
reported in the Cutler and Summers article. This Article uses the correct figure.
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FIGURE 2
EFFECT OF LITIGATION EVENTS ON TEXACO AND
PENNZOIL'S COMBINED VALUE
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This chart shows that collectively, litigation news reduced the value of
the combined firms by $4.291 billion. This compares to the $1.945 billion
gained from settlement news.
Cutler and Summers concluded that most of the lost economic value was
not attributable to the transaction cost of litigation. 21 Instead, the lawsuit
involved potential liability that could cause Texaco financial distress (and
eventually the company did file for bankruptcy). What caused the economic
loss then? The simple answer is this: the uncertainty and unpredictability of
the lawsuit imposed a cost of financial distress, arising from an increase in
Texaco's cost of capital, which could not be captured in a concomitant de-
crease in Pennzoil's cost of capital. 219 "Although the payment of a judgment
is always zero sum, the valuational considerations are not necessarily so. In
218. Cutler and Summers concluded that "legal disputes can impose large costs on a
firm, and that the indirect effects of conflict on profitability can be substantially greater than
the direct expense of the litigation." Id. at 170; see also Bhagat et al., supra note 213, at 222
23 ("Indirect costs of financial distress, in contrast, are potentially more important [than the
direct costs, such as legal and other administrative fees].').
219. Rhee, Price Theory of Legal Bargaining, supra note 26, at 663.
6000
Feb. 12, 1987:
Texas court of appeals
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the public market at least, uncertainty creates a cost that was not captured as
a surplus by the opposing side."
220
Another case study illustrating the effects of catastrophic liability risk
and the cost of financial distress is the BP Deepwater Horizon accident. On
April 20, 2010, the offshore oil rig, Deepwater Horizon, which was leased
by British Petroleum ("BP"), exploded and caused the largest oil spill in
history.221 As the magnitude of the disaster became apparent, the market
value of BP's stock plummeted. In the stock price chart below, I have com-
pared BP's stock price to a composite index of peer oil companies for the
two-year period from August 2009 to August 201 1.222
FIGURE 3
COMPARISON OF BP's STOCK PRICE TO COMPOSITE
INDEX OF PEER OIL COMPANIES
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Before the accident, BP's stock price had been highly correlated to the
stock prices of its peers. After the accident, BP's stock value declined pre-
cipitously as the market anticipated catastrophic legal liability. BP's stock
price became less correlated with and more decoupled from its peer group.
The market was factoring legal liability and cleanup cost into the stock
220. Id.
221. Tom Zeller Jr., Estimates Suggest Spill Is Biggest in U.S. History, N.Y. TIMES, May
28, 2010, at A 15, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/05/28/us/28flow.html.
222. The peer companies are ExxonMobile (XOM), ConocoPhillips (COP), Royal
Dutch/Shell (RDS-A), and Chevron (CVX). The stock prices of BP and its peers were indexed
to a common baseline of 100, and the percent increases and decreases were tracked over time.
The composite index was not weighted for market capitalizations but instead is a simple aver-
age of the peer group.
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price. However, the stock price also included a risk premium for the possi-
bility that liability and cleanup could exceed BP's net worth resulting in
insolvency.
223
The slide in the stock price abated when BP announced on June 16,
2010, that it had established a $20 billion compensation fund to pay claims
in lieu of legal action.224 The compensation fund is not capped at $20 bil-
lion,225 and it does not preclude plaintiffs from filing suit.226 Following the
announcement, however, the stock price increased and once again corre-
lated to the peer group. Why? Because the compensation fund established
a soft floor on liability. The mass elimination of legal actions implied by
the enormous fund amount suggested that much of the catastrophic risk of
legal liability had been removed. Like the September 11 Victim Compen-
sation Fund established almost a decade earlier, perhaps the sentiment was
that most victims of BP Deepwater Horizon would choose the speedy, ad-
ministratively simpler option provided by the compensation fund.
2 27
Nevertheless, BP's stock price continued to suffer from a substantial
discount to its peers. As of August 3, 2011 (an arbitrary cutoff date for the
analysis here), BP's peers enjoyed a 62% valuation premium to BP's stock
price, which closed at $43.18. As of that date, BP had a market capitaliza-
tion of approximately $136 billion. 22 Assume that Deepwater Horizon did
not spill oil and that BP's stock price correlated tightly to its peer group as it
had done before the accident: if so, BP's market capitalization would have
been around $220 billion. Thus, the difference between BP's implied value
and its actual value was $84 billion, a loss which is attributable to the acci-
dent.
BP's compensation fund is $20 billion with an additional commitment
of funds if this amount proves insufficient to cover all claims. BP must also
bear the cost of cleanup. The company has set aside over $40 billion for
223. Before the establishment of the compensation fund, there were speculations that BP
could be forced into bankruptcy or be acquired in a hostile takeover. See Andrew Ross Sorkin,
Imagining the Worst in BP's Future, N.Y. TIMES, June 8, 2010, at B 1.
224. Press Release, BP, BP Establishes $20 Billion Claims Fund for Deepwater Horizon
Spill and Outlines Dividend Decisions (June 16, 2010), available at http://www.bp.com/
genericarticle.do?categoryld=2012968&contentId=7062966.
225. Id. ("The fund does not represent a cap on BP liabilities, but will be available to
satisfy legitimate claims.").
226. The numerous lawsuits have been consolidated in a multidistrict litigation. See U.S.
DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA, MDL-2179 Oil Spill by the Oil Rig
"Deepwater Horizon," http://www.laed.uscourts.gov/OilSpill/OilSpill.htm (last updated Mar.
14, 2012).
227. See LLOYD DIXON & RACHEL KAGANOFF STERN, RAND INST. FOR CIVIL JUSTICE,
COMPENSATION FOR LOSSES FROM THE 9/11 ATTACKS 24 25 (2004) (noting that 2,879 claims
out of 2,976 deaths (representing 97 percent) were filed with the 9/11 fund). The BP Deep-
water Horizon Disaster Victim Compensation Fund is administered by Kenneth Feinberg, the
same administrator of the September 11 Victim Compensation Fund. Id. at 19.
228. As of June 30, 2011, BP had shares outstanding of 3.156 billion shares. Share Buy-
back and Shares in Issue, BP, http://www.bp.com/extendedsectiongenericarticle.do?
categoryld=9000533&contentld=7001189 (last visited Mar. 18, 2012).
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compensation and cleanup, 2 9 which one assumes is the company's best
guess at the value of the total loss. Yet the market is discounting the com-
pany's value by another $44 billion. Much of the lost value is attributable
to the uncertainty surrounding the total liability. Since the market cannot
predict with precision what the total amount will be, it factors in a substan-
tial risk premium.
BP's stock value loss illustrates the financial and economic effects of
catastrophic loss and risk on a corporate defendant. Punitive damages can
impose the risk of catastrophic loss on a firm. This creates uncertainty, and
it may require the payment of a large risk premium by a defendant. To the
extent that this risk premium does not serve a deterrence purpose, it creates
a situation in which the legal action is overvalued and thus the defendant is
overdeterred.
IV. TOWARD OPTIMAL LIABILITY AND DETERRENCE
A. Arbitrage and Efficient Pricing
Part III shows that different risk exposures create antipodal, systematic
risk arbitrage opportunities: arbitrage in favor of defendants when the risk is
ordinary, and arbitrage in favor of plaintiffs when the risk is catastrophic. In
the former, there is liability leakage and thus underdeterrence. In the latter,
there is excess liability and thus overdeterrence. Plaintiffs are justified in
arguing for unconstrained punitive damages, and defendants are justified in
arguing for restraint. An economic theory of punitive damages must balance
these tensions.
In financial economics, the principle of no arbitrage states that sustained
arbitrage opportunities should not exist in an efficient market.23 0 Once a
price discrepancy is found, an arbitrageur makes riskless profit by buying or
selling an underpriced or overpriced asset. When the price discrepancy be-
comes known in the market, the price corrects and the arbitrage opportunity
disappears. Asset prices are efficient in the sense that they reflect the market
view of intrinsic value.
Sustained exploitation of arbitrage undermines efficiency in capital mar-
kets and in the tort system as well. If the tort and litigation systems are
pricing mechanisms to determine the value of harmful activities and legal
actions, prices at efficient levels yield optimal deterrence. The existence of
risk arbitrage opportunities in litigation produces inefficient outcomes. The
policy goal should be to eliminate arbitrage opportunities and maintain effi-
cient prices in the tort system. Since the two categories of risk (ordinary and
catastrophic) are the key variables in producing antipodal effects on optimal
229. Graeme Wearden, BP Prfits Dip as Deepwater Horizon Costs Continue to Mount,
GUARDIAN (U.K.), Apr. 27, 2011, http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/201 l/apr/27/bp-profits-
dip-deepwater-horizon-costs (reporting that BP has set aside $40.9 billion to pay for the
environmental disaster); see also Sorkin, supra note 223 (noting that "something approaching
$40 billion is not out of the question" for compensation and cleanup).
230. BREALEY ET AL., supra note 14, at 38.
October 2012]
Michigan Law Review
deterrence, different approaches are needed to mitigate risk arbitrage in
these different classes of cases.
B. Mitigating Risk Arbitrage in Ordinary Cases
In most ordinary cases, the Campbell- or Baker-type of limit on punitive
damages makes no sense because it preserves the corporate defendant's risk
arbitrage and thus undermines optimal deterrence by systematically produc-
ing undervalued cases. Empirical evidence has confirmed the nonnecessity
of such limits in most ordinary cases. Punitive damages are not at play be-
cause the level of conduct does not merit an award. A defendant is most
susceptible to punitive liability when he engages in intentional torts, fraud,
discrimination, or economic wrongs.2 ' Punitive damages are usually not
granted in ordinary negligence actions. Even when they are granted, the lev-
el of liability is ordinary.
To the extent that punitive damages are at issue, they help to offset a
corporate defendant's risk arbitrage opportunity. While a defendant typically
is less risk averse, has a lower opportunity cost, and can mitigate the vari-
ance of an individual outcome due to portfolio diversification, 23 2 the threat
of punitive damages increases the defendant's risk profile. This increase in
risk helps to eliminate the otherwise asymmetric risk profile. Consistent
with the arguments advanced by tort reformists and business interest lobby-
ists, 2 3 plaintiffs gain an advantage at settlement in claiming punitive
damages.
Plaintiffs' attorneys acknowledge that punitive damages claims provide
important leverage to their clients. In interviews, many litigators main-
tained that the defense would not come to the bargaining table with "a fair
settlement" unless punitive damages were a real possibility.... Attorneys
prosecuting securities fraud cases maintain that punitive damages are key
to just and prompt settlement. These lawyers argue that if defendants do
not face the possibility of a large punitive damages verdict, corporations
have little or no incentive to settle for fair compensatory damages. 234
These empirical observations are widely known to litigating parties and
their lawyers and are predicted by this Article's risk-based financial eco-
nomic analysis of the relationship between settlement and punitive
damages.
235
When the level of compensatory damages is low, there is good reason
not to cap punitive damages until they reach the point of causing financial
distress. While the standard law and economics theory suggests that punitive
231. At least since 1960, there has been a proliferation of punitive awards based on reck-
less vis-A-vis malicious conduct. Sharkey, supra note 17, at 364. This development supports
the nonretributive rationale for punitive damages. Id. at 364-65.
232. See supra Section tII.B.
233. See supra note 178 and accompanying text.
234. Koenig, supra note 29, at 176.
235. See supra Part I1.
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damages should be capped at the level of escaped liability for wrongful con-
duct, this rule may nevertheless result in underdeterrence in a dispute
resolution system in which most actions are privately settled. An example
illustrates the point. Assume that the harm is 200, a low amount relative to
the defendant's wealth, and the probability of detection is II %, a fairly low
detection rate. The parties are aware that punitive damages are capped by
the standard law and economics rule. The parties also agree on the prospects
for the outcome of the case: the probability of liability is 50%, and on a
plaintiff win the probability of a punitive damages award is 50%. The ex-
pected value of trial is 500,236 which produces the optimal level of liability
based on the probabilities of detection and trial and the costs of the defend-
ant's activities. However, since the defendant enjoys an asymmetric risk
advantage and thus an arbitrage in the pricing of the disputed legal right, a
settlement will likely be reached at a lower amount than the expected value.
Assume that an average plaintiff would give a discount of 20%, so that the
parties settle at 400. Liability is less than the level of optimal deterrence.
The dynamics of settlement undermine the law and economics theory of
optimal deterrence.
Assume now that there is no cap on punitive damages. The defendant
still expects punitive damages, if assessed, to be fairly low and correlated to
the compensatory damages; but now there is a minute risk of an outlier
award. Suppose that the outlier award could be as high as 258x (the kind
seen in Gore and Campbell), with a minute 0.1% probability of the outlier
occurring (that is, a I in 1,000 chance, or the proverbial lightning strike).
Although this liability would be very substantial, it would not cause finan-
cial distress (the liability amount may be high but not severe as defined in
this Article). The expected value of the outlier case is 51.8,237 and the ex-
pected value of the combined outcomes is 550.238 These facts change the
dynamics of settlement. The parties must account for a very small but real
chance of a high outlier award. The plaintiff may still be willing to concede
a 20% discount, which is a discount of 110. However, consistent with the
risk transfer and catastrophic risk pricing principles seen in Section III.C,
the defendant may add a risk premium to the expected value of an outlier
award. 239 For catastrophic risk, this risk premium could be multiples of the
236. This is calculated as follows: No Liability (50% x 0) + Liability (200 x 25%) +
Punitive Liability (1,800 x 25%) = 500. The punitive damage multiple is 8x based on (1/11%
-1).
237. This is calculated as follows: (258 x 200 + 200) : 1,000 = 51.8.
238. This is calculated as follows: No Liability (0 x 50%) + Liability (200 x 25%) +
Punitive Liability (1,800 x 249/1,000) + Outlier Punitive Liability [(258 x 200 + 200) - 1,000]
= 550.
239. Anecdotal evidence from insurance claims settlement practices supports the view
that even insurance companies add a premium to expected value to eliminate the risk of outlier
awards. Laurence Ross observed that insurance companies may offer "danger value," which is
a premium in excess of the expected value, to eliminate exposure to a potentially severe jury
verdict. LAURENCE Ross, SETTLED OUT OF COURT: THE SOCIAL PROCESS OF INSURANCE
CLAIMS ADJUSTMENTS 202 (1970).
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expected value. Suppose that the risk premium is 116% of the expected val-
ue of the outlier, or 60. Absent this risk premium, settlement would occur at
440 due to the plaintiff's concession of a discount. But with the risk premi-
um added to account for the risk of the outlier, it would occur at 500, the
level required for optimal deterrence.
I do not suggest that in practice the numbers work out in these exacting
ways. The point is not that settlements can take place with such mathemati-
cal precision, but instead it is to show that the effects of discount and
premium tend to offset in a way that minimizes a corporate defendant's risk
arbitrage. If minute risks of outliers were introduced into the settlement cal-
culus, valuations at settlement would approach risk-neutral levels. Thus,
even a very small risk of an outlier award can advance the goal of optimal
deterrence in ordinary cases by offsetting a corporate defendant's risk arbi-
trage opportunity.
Based on the considerations in this Section, the rule of punitive damages
should be this: when compensatory damages are low relative to the defend-
ant's wealth and the expected liability is ordinary, there should be no cap on
punitive damages up to the point at which total liability resulting from a
high punitive damages multiplier produces financial distress. In this way, a
corporate defendant's risk arbitrage opportunity would be offset by the risk
premium that the plaintiff would concede at settlement to eliminate (insure
against) the prospect of a highly variable cash flow arising from the litiga-
tion process.
C. Mitigating Risk Arbitrage in Catastrophic Cases
In the infrequent cases of potentially extreme liability, the risk arbitrage
opportunity flips to the plaintiff's advantage and thus undermines optimal
deterrence by systematically producing overvalued cases. Facing potentially
extreme liability with the threat of financial distress or insolvency, a firm
will want to eliminate this risk and so will pay a hefty risk premium. The
firm will thus settle the claim, and the settlement value will favor the plain-
tiff who can use the threat of extreme liability as leverage. The risk premium
a defendant pays constitutes the economic cost associated with the risk of
financial distress. In these cases, defendants need special protection.
The cost of the risk premium is incurred whether the corporate defend-
ant settles or not: in settlement, it is paid in cash as the settlement amount;
otherwise, the cost is reflected in the firm's valuation. From a corporate fi-
nance perspective, in the absence of settlement, the firm's cost of equity will
increase due to the increased probability of bankruptcy, while the value of
the firm, including the value of the equity and debt held by the firm, will
decrease. From a larger perspective, the efficient capital markets hypothesis
suggests that information concerning legal liability is incorporated into the
price of the security. 40 The weak form of the hypothesis, generally consid-
240. See Eugene F. Fama, Efficient Capital Markets: A Review of Theory and Empirical
Work, 25 J. FIN. 383 (1970) (setting forth the different forms of efficiency); Ronald J. Gilson
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ered valid, suggests that all past information has been incorporated into the
current security price.241 The effect of information, positive or negative, can
be offset by the disclosure of other information, but the prior information
concerning the tort action in question is embedded in the security price. The
loss of value is real and is suffered by the firm's shareholders and creditors.
The cost of risk transfer in settlement and the economic cost of financial
distress are real and borne by the firm. To the extent that this premium ex-
ceeds the expected value of the harm and any potential escaped liability,
defendants are overdeterred. An economic theory of punitive damages must
credit this cost in the calculus of optimal deterrence.
Obviously, compensatory damages are fair game in torts, and financial
distress is no reason to reduce the amount of compensatory damages. 242 A
tortfeasor must pay for all harms inflicted on the plaintiff for its wrongful
acts. However, punitive damages do not compensate; they are meant to pun-
ish a defendant on a discretionary basis. They should not impose substantial
financial distress. If a corporation, or any tort defendant for that matter, was
entitled to Eighth Amendment protection with respect to punitive damages
in a tort action among private parties,2 43 the imposition of financial distress
or insolvency could very well constitute excessive punishment. Applying
standard law and economics theory, one could argue that punitive damages
should be applied to a firm anytime it escapes liability. However, when
compensatory damages are high, the chances are that the conduct in ques-
tion is an unfortunate one-off transaction. Even if there is the chance of
escaped liability from other transactions, we intuit that the economic cost of
financial distress and social cost of insolvency are far greater than the ad-
verse effect of escaped liability on incentives.
The rule against financial distress can be illustrated by a simple budget
line.
& Reinier H. Kraakman, The Mechanisms qf Market Efficiency, 70 VA. L. REv. 549, 554 55
(1984) (discussing the efficient capital market hypothesis).
241. FRANK J. FABOZZI & FRANCO MODIGLIANI, CAPITAL MARKETS: INSTITUTIONS AND
INSTRUMENTS 291 (4th ed. 2009).
242. Corporations and other limited liability entities enjoy the benefit of limited liability,
which ensures that a portion of the harms created are externalized to tort victims. See Hans-
mann & Kraakman, supra note 137, at 1916-23; Rhee, supra note 137, at 1433-35.
243. See Browning-Ferris Indus. of Vt., Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 263
64, 275 (1989) (holding that the Eighth Amendment does not apply in a civil action for money
damages among private parties); id. at 285 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part) (joined by Justice Stevens) (arguing that the Eighth Amendment should apply to corpora-
tions).
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FIGURE 4
BUDGET LINE FOR LEGAL LIABILITY
K(max)
2
Q Non-Distress Financial Distress
Legal Liability
Ci
Compensatory Damages (C) C(max)
The amount of liability I is the line that divides financial nondistress from
financial distress. We note that K is the punitive financial cost, which is the
total economic cost of punitive damages having two components: (1) the legal
award of punitive damages P, which is a cash amount, and (2) the financial
economic cost F associated with the legal action, which is a noncash econom-
ic cost borne by the defendant including a risk premium at settlement, an
increase in the cost of equity, and the cost of bankruptcy.
The line dividing nondistress and distress is marked by two endpoints,
high punitive damages and high compensatory damages. It demarcates the
budget line for the maximum imposable punitive financial costs: nondistress
is defined as the interval [0, I. This suggests that with nominal compensa-
tory damages, I = K(max), and with no punitive damages, I = C(max). At
any given point in the interval [0, 1I, we can state the liability amount that
would not impose financial distress as: L = Ki + C.
Another way to state the proposed rule is this: when compensatory dam-
ages are more than nominal, punitive damages should be capped such that
punitive financial costs do not create financial distress. This rule is repre-
sented by the expression P <I - C - F1. Punitive damages are the maximum
potential residual liability that can be imposed net of compensatory damages
and the financial economic cost associated with the action.
244
The proposed rule has several implications arising from the three ways
in which liability can reach the zone of financial distress.
244. This assumes that compensatory damages do not by themselves impart financial
distress, and thus C < 1.
[Vol. 111:33
Financial Economic Theory of Punitive Damages
1. The case of extreme compensatory damages. For a corporation, cases
of extreme compensatory damages typically involve megatorts or mass torts
such as the Exxon oil spill in Prince William Sound, BP's Deepwater Hori-
zon incident, and the Texaco-Pennzoil incident. Many class actions also fall
into this category. In these cases, the issue of punitive damages is really
subordinate to the larger issue of compensation, though punitive damages
can exacerbate the defendant's financial situation and may constitute the
marginal increase in liability that begets insolvency.
When compensation is so large that it threatens financial distress, the
punitive financial costs tend to outweigh any of the benefits from imposing
punitive damages. The rationale for punitive damages largely dissipates for
several reasons: (1) such claims are hard-pressed to escape detection and
accountability, (2) compensation alone fully internalizes the cost of wrong-
ful conduct, and (3) the size of the compensation claim and the resulting
settlement pressure tend to eliminate a defendant's risk arbitrage.
The Supreme Court intuited this concept when it suggested in Campbell
that if compensatory damages are substantial, perhaps only a multiple of lx
can satisfy due process. 245 Also, the same rationale likely guided the Court's
decision in Baker, which would serve to explain the I x multiple rule in mar-
itime cases. To the extent that the intuition is to limit punitive damages
when a defendant must pay high compensatory damages relative to its
wealth, the Court's reasoning is well founded on the theory that the costs of
financial distress outweigh any deterrence (or even retributive) rationale,
particularly when the defendant will already be paying a high price for its
wrongful conduct.
Cases involving extreme compensatory damages may require more judi-
cial intervention and constraints on the jury. Empirical scholarship has
shown that the amount of punitive damages is correlated to the amount of
compensatory damages.2 46 If the size of compensatory damages is an indica-
tion of the harmfulness of the defendant's conduct, the correlation is
rational. At a certain point, however, compensatory damages become so
large relative to the defendant's wealth that the commensurate award of pu-
nitive damages imposes more costs on the defendant than is justified by the
underlying conduct or the possibility of escaped liability. Indeed, escaped
liability is most likely not an issue when compensatory damages are large
because such disputes are the most likely to be discovered and prosecuted.
2. The case of low compensatory damages and extreme punitive
damages. This is the Gore-type case where the compensatory damages are
low but the multiple is very high, resulting in an extreme amount of punitive
damages relative to the amount of compensatory damages. Also, as in Gore,
the amount of punitive damages though extreme in relative terms is not ex-
treme in absolute terms and not within the zone of financial distress. In such
245. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 425 (2003).
246. "Far from being randomly related, the punitive damages awards increase monoton-
ically with compensatory damages in a statistically significant manner." Eisenberg et al. 1997,
supra note 17, at 639.
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circumstances, there is little justification for specially limiting punitive
damages beyond the traditional legal standard. The probability of escaped
liability is just one consideration. The risk of high punitive damages tends to
offset the defendant's risk arbitrage opportunity by imposing more risk on
the defendant. However, the potential risk of a high multiple award would
not threaten financial distress. In this situation, artificially capping punitive
damages would only preserve the corporate defendant's advantages at set-
tlement and thus would tend to underdeter.
A glimpse of this concept is seen in the Supreme Court case law. Alt-
hough the Court in Campbell set forth a broadly applicable single-digit
multiplier cap, it also suggested that larger multiples may be appropriate
when compensatory damages are low.247 The Court did not explain further,
and so some guesswork is needed to determine the contours of this excep-
tion. The most plausible construction of the exception is that it is limited to
cases with low absolute values of punitive damages. For example, we can
hypothesize that a nominal compensatory award of $1 may support a 500x
multiple for a total liability of $501; such liabilities are not the type of
awards that have long concerned the Court. The Court is primarily con-
cerned about protecting corporations and preserving its power to regulate
judicially the economics of mass-tort liability.248 Thus, it may consider sus-
pect the same 500x multiple if it resulted in a liability of $2,004,000 against
a national corporation, as was the case in Gore. If this is what the Court had
in mind-that small dollar value cases do not concern it, but big dollar val-
ues do-then the distinction is one without principles and theoretical
support. As long as an award of punitive damages is supported by the tradi-
tional legal standards as defined under state law, liability should not be
limited just because the multiple or the dollar value is high. Such an arbi-
trary scheme has no sound basis in policy or theory.
3. The case of substantial compensatory and punitive damages. This
profile represents the least problematic, most straightforward case. Since
punitive damages are in line with compensatory damages, these cases do not
run afoul of Campbell. However, while neither substantial compensatory
damages nor punitive damages may be sufficient alone to trigger financial
distress, the combination could do so. Consistent with the proposed rule
here, punitive damages should be constrained sufficiently to prevent finan-
cial distress. This means that even punitive damages complying with
Campbell's single-digit ratio may result in too much liability.
Lastly, I address a potential objection to the proposed rule protecting firms
against financial distress: that the proposed rule might incentivize firms to
"game" capital structure to their advantage through undercapitalization. This
247. Campbell, 538 U.S. at 425 ("[R]atios greater than those we have previously upheld
may comport with due process where a particularly egregious act has resulted in only a small
amount of economic damages." (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also BMW of N.
Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 582 (1996) ("Indeed, low awards of compensatory damages
may properly support a higher ratio than high compensatory awards, if, for example, a particu-
larly egregious act has resulted in only a small amount of economic damages.").
248. See supra Sections IA, III.A.
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objection is academic and not one of practical significance. As seminal work
in financial economics has shown, capital structure is a very important con-
sideration for the value of firms when real-world constraints such as tax
policy, bankruptcy, and transaction costs are considered. 249 Any potential gain
from undercapitalization motivated by a desire to avoid punitive damages
would be quickly exceeded by the costs associated with a suboptimal capital
structure that fails to optimize tax savings, the cost of capital, and the transac-
tion costs of capital raising. The firm's recurring operational and financial
needs would outweigh the benefits of a "gamed" capital structure in the
event of a nonrecurring, infrequent event like the assessment of a severe
punitive damages award.
D. The Role of Wealth and Administrative Issues
Not surprisingly, the relevance of the defendant's wealth in calculating
the size of a damages award is disputed. Although some courts have sug-
gested that wealth is irrelevant 25 0 many jurisdictions instruct juries that
wealth is a relevant factor.2 1' The arguments for and against are well de-
fined. Since money has a marginal utility, plaintiffs argue that appropriate
punishment and deterrence are achieved when the defendant's wealth is con-
sidered. However, it is easy to see that involving wealth as a factor "invites
juries to engage in wealth redistribution and exacerbates the perverse incen-
tives already created by uncertain standards of punitive damage liability. ''
2
Many commentators have suggested that wealth should be irrelevant.2 3 From
249. See Franco Modigliani & Merton H. Miller, Corporate Income Taxes and the Cost
of Capital: A Correction, 53 AM. ECON. REV. 433 (1963); Franco Modigliani & Merton H.
Miller, The Cost of Capital, Corporation Finance and the Theory of Investment, 48 AM. ECON.
REV. 261 (1958).
250. See Kemezy v. Peters, 79 E3d 33, 35 (7th Cir. 1996) (Posner, J.) (noting that none
of the rationales for punitive damages "depends critically on proof [of] the defendant's income
or wealth").
251. See, e.g., Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 22 (1991) (permitting con-
sideration of defendant's "financial position"); TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Res. Corp., 509
U.S. 443, 492 (1993) (O'Connor, J., dissenting) ("As a historical matter, the wealth of the
perpetrator long has been thought relevant'"); Ultimate Chem. Co. v. Surface Transp. Int'l,
Inc., 658 R2d 1008, 1012 (Kan. 1983) (same).
252. Dorsey D. Ellis, Jr., Fairness and Efficiency in the Law of Punitive Damages, 56 S.
CAL. L. REV. 1, 63 (1982).
Corporations are mere abstractions and, as such, are unlikely to be viewed with much
sympathy. Moreover, they often represent a large accumulation of productive resources;
jurors naturally think little of taking an otherwise large sum of money out of what ap-
pears to be an enormously larger pool of wealth. Finally, juries may feel privileged to
correct perceived social ills stemming from unequal wealth distribution by transferring
money from "wealthy" corporations to comparatively needier plaintiffs.
TXO, 509 U.S. at 491 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
253. See, e.g., Kenneth S. Abraham & John C. Jeffries, Jr., Punitive Damages and the
Rule of Law: The Role of Defendant's Wealth, 18 J. LEGAL STUD. 415, 415 (1989); Robert D.
Cooter, Punitive Damages for Deterrence: When and How Much?, 40 ALA. L. REv. 1143,
1177 (1989); Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 17, at 911; Gary T. Schwartz, Deterrence and
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the perspective of the standard law and economics model, wealth is irrele-
vant because it is not a factor in achieving full cost internalization for
wrongful conduct.254
This Article argues that wealth is relevant for two reasons, both of which
are counterintuitive to the way in which wealth has traditionally been under-
stood. First, to the extent that wealth is one factor in a set of criteria that
jurors use to assess punitive damages, it tends to increase unpredictability
and variance of outcomes. The defendant's wealth is typically understood as
a litigation sword wielded by the plaintiff. As a policy matter, the threat of a
nonlethal lightning strike positively serves the deterrence function. Wealth
as a variable in the calculus of punitive damages tends to create some uncer-
tainty in the outcome. As argued in this Article, some unpredictability and
uncertainty is a good thing. This proposition is against the weight of schol-
arship, and for that matter against the authority of Baker, both of which
argue for the virtues of greater certainty and predictability. The defendant's
wealth serves an instrumental goal-neutralizing the defendant's risk arbi-
trage in ordinary cases. Moreover, as other scholars have noted, taking
wealth into account is justified by a rational nexus between the utility
gained from engaging in harmful conduct and the goal of deterrence.
Second, under the theory advanced in this Article, the defendant's
wealth is relevant because it should be a shield against excessive liability.
Wealth is the factor that determines the upper boundary of punitive damag-
es. Ordinarily, wealth is seen as a justification, correctly applied or not, for
an upward adjustment in punitive damages. But it also defines the limit of
punitive damages. In addition to the question of adequate deterrence, evi-
dence of wealth should also be used to protect defendants against excessive
punitive damages. The central thesis here is that financial distress should be
avoided, and financial distress is a function of the defendant's wealth. The
less wealth, the lower the threshold of financial distress, and vice versa.
This Article shows that the intrusion of Gore and Campbell into the po-
licing of punitive damages was largely unwarranted. In most cases,
traditional state procedural measures suffice to protect defendants. Wealth
should continue to be relevant to the jury's consideration. 211 However, juries
should also be instructed that evidence of wealth, if presented, should be
relevant to financial distress, and that financial distress marks the limit of
punitive damages. Awards that exceed this limit should be subject to remit-
tur and appellate review.
Punishment in the Common Law of Punitive Damages: A Comment, 56 S. CAL. L. REV. 133,
140 (1982). But see Jennifer H. Arlen, Should Defendants' Wealth Matter?, 21 J. LEGAL STUD.
413,415 (1992) (arguing that there is a deterrence effect on risk-averse defendants).
254. Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 17, at 911.
255. See supra note 251.
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V. REASSESSING GORE, CAMPBELL, WILLIAMS, AND BAKER
In fundamentally reforming the jurisprudence on punitive damages, the
Supreme Court was driven by a visceral sense of proper economic propor-
tions. Without a theoretical framework, however, the line of cases including
Gore, Campbell, Williams, and Baker appears to be the product of conspicu-
ous judicial protectionism of big corporate interests at the expense of
plaintiffs, thus undermining the credibility of the rulings and indeed the
Court as well. One wonders whether the highly publicized Texaco-Pennzoil
case left an indelible impression on the Supreme Court regarding the impact
of punitive damages on corporations and business in general. The Court
played a minor role in this landmark litigation,256 but for the most part it
watched from the sidelines as two giant oil companies used tort law and
punitive damages to inflict severe damage on each other's economic value.
In December 1987, the case settled,257 but the litigation and its trial outcome
shocked the business community.258 It showed that a single tort action with
substantial punitive damages awarded by a jury can bankrupt public compa-
nies. Two years later in 1989, the Court embarked on its constitutional
reformation with its decision in Browning-Ferris.2 9 In that case, Justice
O'Connor argued in dissent that "[a]wards of punitive damages are skyrock-
eting. '260 In 1991 in Haslip, she called punitive damages a "powerful
weapon. '26 1 And in 1993 in TXO, she called the punitive damages amount
there "a monstrous award.'' 2 2 In 1996 in Gore, she joined the majority that
finally struck down high-multiple awards.
At first blush, Gore and Campbell seem like ideal candidates to impose
order in the world of seemingly uncertain and unpredictable outcomes. The
multiples in these cases were unusually high, and the cases seem like outli-
ers. But the facts there differed significantly from Texaco-Pennzoil in
important ways. Texaco-Pennzoil was a one-shot, "all-in" business litigation
involving an entity-level transaction-the judicial outcome would substantial-
ly affect the litigants. On the other hand, Gore and Campbell concerned
routine business transactions, and in both cases there was underlying evidence
256. It ruled that the federal district court should have abstained from issuing an injunc-
tion related to the posting of a bond for appeal in state court. Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco Inc., 481
U.S. 1 (1987).
257. Mnookin & Wilson, supra note 33, at 308.
258. See Barbara Shook, Ex-Getty Directors Say No Pennzoil Deal Made, Hous.
CHRON., May 27, 1987, at DI (quoting Getty Oil directors as saying that the case "sent shock
waves through the international business community and [shook] investors' faith in America
as a good and predictable place to do business"); Debra Whitefield, Texaco Shareholders Voice
Views on Pennzoil Battle, L.A. TIMES, May 14, 1986 (noting that shareholders "expressed
shock over the verdict").
259. Browning-Ferris Indus. of Vt., Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257 (1989)
260. Id. at 282 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
261. Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 42 (1991) (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
262. TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Res. Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 473 (1993) (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting).
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of repeated, undetected tortious activities that would merit punitive damages
to optimize cost internalization."' Punitive damages would be consistent
with the standard law and economics model of punitive damages as applied,
for example, in Judge Posner's opinion in Mathias.264 The multipliers in
Gore and Campbell appear to be outliers, but more importantly the two cas-
es involved routine amounts of liability. The judgment amounts, $2 million
and $145 million, were small sums to the defendants. A $2 million judgment
of punitive damages may be devastating to a small firm, but it would be a
small amount in the operating budget and relative to the net worth of a large
national corporation like BMW. And, while the $145 million award in
Campbell seems like an impressive award, at the time of the trial it was less
than 1 percent of State Farm's policyholders' surplus.2 65 In relative terms,
the award is equivalent to an $8,043 judgment against a small entrepreneuri-
al firm with a net worth of $1 million. There is no question that the awards
in Gore and Campbell in terms of absolute amounts were rather ordinary,
and the freakish nature of the multipliers does not detract from the ordinari-
ness of the action. These cases were wrongly decided. There was no need
for Supreme Court intervention in these ordinary cases where the variance
of outcome served a positive jurisprudential function.
The issue of whether an award is optimal cannot be answered by refer-
ence to the absolute sum or the multiple.26 6 Punitive damages can reduce
social cost and enhance social welfare by optimizing cost internalization, or
they can be inefficiently applied. Excessive punitive damages can lead to
undesirable wealth transfers and impose large economic costs related to fi-
nancial distress as seen in cases like Texaco-Pennzoil and BP Deepwater
Horizon. Insolvency and financial distress impart social costs that reduce
social wealth. In these cases, the wrongdoers fully pay for the harms inflict-
ed on the plaintiffs through compensatory damages.
So what role should punitive damages play according to the Court? The
answer is unclear after Williams and Baker. By holding that punitive damag-
es cannot be used to punish a defendant for injuring nonparties,26 7 Williams
shields recidivist tortfeasors from paying the full cost of their harmful ac-
263. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408,415 (2003); BMW of N.
Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 573-74 (1996).
264. See supra Section II.A.
265. In 1989, the year of the trial, State Farm's policyholders' surplus, which is the equi-
ty in a mutual insurance company, was $18,028,886,000. A.M. BEST Co., BEST'S INSURANCE
REPORTS: PROPERTY-CASUALTY 2720 (1990). Currently, State Farm is ranked 37th in the For-
tune 500 among U.S. companies with equity of over $63 billion, Fortune 500, FORTUNE,
May 23, 2011, available at http://money.cnn.com/magazines/fortune/fortune500/2011/
index.html, and 116th in the Fortune 500 among all global companies, Global 500, FORTUNE,
July 25, 2011, available at http://money.cnn.com/magazines/fortune/global500/201 1/.
266. See TXO, 509 U.S. at 467 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment) ("The Consti-
tution identifies no particular multiple of compensatory damages as an acceptable limit for
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tivities.268 Is there any doubt that cigarette manufacturers would escape lia-
bility for causing harm to thousands of consumers if they were dead, could
not prove causation, or declined to sue for whatever reason ?
2 69
Williams cannot be explained, let alone justified, on the theory of cost
internalization, which leaves two competing explanations: a pro-business
protectionist policy or a theory of punitive damages as retribution. However,
I glean another explanation by asking a simple question: why did the Court
decide Williams differently from Gore and Campbell'? Notably the Court
declined to reject the $79.5 million punitive award, a multiple of 96.8x,
through the simplest route. It could have applied Campbell's single-digit cap
to strike down the award, which was an argument that Philip Morris ad-
vanced.
2
10
Williams posed several new problems for the Court. As noted previously,
it was the only case involving personal injuries with clear reprehensibility.
Other major cases concerned economic torts. The Court declined to apply
Campbell perhaps because it wanted to preserve greater flexibility for devia-
tions from Campbell in personal injury cases. Superficially, Williams also
seems similar to Gore and Campbell in that a $79.5 million award would
not have caused Philip Morris financial distress. But the facts in Williams
suggest an exposure to repeated high severity awards due to (1) the high
number of physically injured victims, (2) the substantial probability of
punitive damages in each case, and (3) the substantial probability of high
multiples. These facts distinguish Williams from Gore and Campbell. High
frequency, high severity punitive awards collectively could cause financial
distress not only for Philip Morris but quite possibly for the entire ciga-
rette manufacturing industry-something that cannot be said for the auto
industry in Gore or the insurance industry in Campbell. Clearly, no de-
fendant should be protected from paying fully compensatory damages.
However, economic policy should be a factor in discretionary awards
when they could cause financial distress to a firm or an entire industry. In
this sense, Williams represents a series of repeated cases that in the aggre-
gate could constitute the equivalent of a one-shot, high-variance outcome
like that seen in Texaco-Pennzoil.
Thus, Williams is unique on its facts. The Court's holding walked a fine
line between permitting high levels of liability, including punitive liability
that may recapture some cost of escaped liability, and mitigating the finan-
cial distress resulting from punitive cost imposition. The Court may have
been concerned not only with the solvency of Philip Morris, but also with
the financial effects of unchecked punitive damages on the entire cigarette
manufacturing industry. The ruling preserved judicial flexibility for upward
268. Law and economics scholars disagree with the approach taken in Williams. See
Calandrillo, supra note 17, at 815 17. Other commentators have suggested that Williams
could spell the end of the law and economics theory of deterrence in punitive damages. See
Colby, supra note 17, at 467-79.
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deviance from Campbell in personal injury cases in future cases, permitted
punitive damages in cigarette cases, and partially shielded the cigarette indus-
try from the economic costs of financial distress caused by punitive liability
vis-i-vis compensatory damages. All in all, Williams can be interpreted as a
practical, rough-cut compromise in the economic regulation of tort liability as
the Court surveyed the landscape of future cigarette litigation.
A year later, the Court decided Baker. To date, Baker is arguably the
most important punitive damages case for three reasons. First, the intellec-
tual candor and clarity in stating the core problem permit a proper framing
of the theoretical issue. It correctly identified the problem of "stark unpre-
dictability" 271 and the elimination of "outlier cases" as the solution to the
core problem of variance. 212 Second, in capping the multiple at lx in mari-
time cases, the Court may have laid the foundation for all federal actions
where punitive damages are recoverable but not otherwise defined by stat-
ute. The holding in Baker is limited to maritime cases, but its rationale is
portable to other federal actions. Third, Baker foretells further constitutional
restrictions on state punitive damages awards. Quoting Campbell, the Court
reiterated that when compensatory damages are substantial, a ratio lower
than just the single-digit cap may be the outermost limit of due process.2"3 In
footnote twenty-eight, the Court suggested that when class actions achieve
compensation for a large number of potential plaintiffs, the constitutional
limit may be a multiplier of I X.2 74 This prompted Justice Ginsburg to ask,
"On next opportunity, will the Court rule, definitively, that 1: 1 is the ceiling
due process requires in all of the States, and for all federal claims?"2 5
The Court in Baker suggested that "ranges of variation might be ac-
ceptable or even desirable if they resulted from judges' and juries' refining
their judgments to reach a generally accepted optimal level of penalty and
deterrence.1276 Despite suggestions that Williams spells the end of deter-
rence as a rationale for punitive damages, Baker reminds us that the Court is
concerned with optimal deterrence-based liability. The Court also suggested
that variance would be desirable if it tends to produce an optimal level of
deterrence. The problem is that the Court perceived variance as being inher-
ently a bad thing and saw no positive role for variance to play in litigation.
This attitude explains the instrumental policy of "pegging punitive to com-
pensatory damages using a ratio or maximum multiple.1217 In doing so, the
Court recognized that its policy could be criticized as "smack[ing] too much
of policy and too little of principle."278 Thus, a theory of punitive damages is
271. Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471, 499 (2008).
272. Id. at 504, 506, 513.
273. Id. at 514 15 (quoting State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408,
425 (2003)).
274. Id. at 515 n.28.
275. Id. at 524 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
276. Id. at 500 (majority opinion) (emphasis added).
277. Id. at 506.
278. Id. at 507.
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needed, and the theory must account for the role of variance in punitive
damages.
CONCLUSION
The real issue in the debate over punitive damages is the variance and
unpredictability of awards. Only a small class of awards poses significant
economic problems warranting additional legal constraints beyond the tradi-
tional state law standards. This small class of cases is characterized by low
frequency of occurrence and high severity of damages, with the latter meas-
ured by losses sufficient to cause financial distress. Litigating parties bear
risk and engage in risk management. Under various conditions, each party
has an opportunity to take advantage of risk arbitrage opportunities arising
from the fact that the counterparty is exposed to greater risk and thus will
concede discounts to settlement values. In cases of ordinary expected liabil-
ity, the plaintiff bears more risk because she is risk averse, she confronts an
all-or-nothing proposition at trial, and she has greater opportunity costs. In
cases involving potentially catastrophic risk, a corporate defendant bears
greater risk because of increased bankruptcy risk and cost of capital, result-
ing in real losses of substantial economic value through corporate financial
effects. Punitive damages substantially affect these risk calculations.
The normative theory advanced here flows from the observation that pu-
nitive damages mitigate risk arbitrage by both parties. When punitive
damages are within the range of normal expectations, even if they result in a
high multiple and dollar value, they serve the legitimate function of offset-
ting a corporate defendant's potential for risk arbitrage in settlement.
However, when punitive damages belong to the class of low frequency, high
severity risks (which is a far smaller subset of a small class of cases in
which punitive damages are awarded), the risk arbitrage opportunity belongs
to the plaintiff. The policy goal is to mitigate these mutual arbitrage oppor-
tunities.
The Supreme Court reformation of punitive damages is overbroad. Gore,
Campbell, and their progeny were wrongly decided and wrongly reasoned
from a deterrence theory of punitive damages. With the possible exception
of Williams, they were unnecessary interventions in favor of corporate inter-
ests. Accordingly, they smack of pro-business protectionism without nuance
or theoretical foundation, thus undermining the rulings and the Court's cred-
ibility.
There are legitimate reasons to protect corporate defendants within cer-
tain limits. Punitive damages should be restricted only in a limited number
of cases in which the punitive damage award is a high severity event involv-
ing a substantial risk of financial distress. Otherwise, the economic costs of
such liability may overdeter and inflict greater social cost than any adverse
incentives placed on defendants by inadequate liability assessment. In all
other cases, however, there is no principled reason to protect corporate de-
fendants from large punitive damages awards.
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